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ABSTRACT
Education of Emotionally Disturbed Children:
A Critique of Behaviorist Trends and an
Examination of a Constructivist Alternative
September 1982
Carol C. Pope, B.A., American University
M.A.
,
Columbia University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Louis Fischer
The dissertation examines the currently predominating
behaviorist approach in the education of emotionally
disturbed children. It addresses both epistemological and
pedagogical inadequacies in terms of broad, general
deficits and with respect to shortcomings in four areas
deemed to be critical in the effective education of this
special group: (a) emotional conflict, (b) problems with
social, emotional and cognitive autonomy, (c) the role of
error, and (d) the role of active inquiry.
In preface to the critique of behaviorist epistemology
and pedagogy, an initial section is devoted to an
explica-
tion of philosophical and psychological perspectives
of the
position. The basic principles of Skinnerian behaviorism
are critically discussed with reference to the
theory itself
v
and the practical implications that follow. As the
behaviorist strategies are assessed in terms of the
learning needs of disturbed children, such strategies
are found to be inadequate in areas of motivation,
transfer of learning, complexity of human thought, and
with specific reference to the four areas mentioned
above
.
Finally, the constructivist alternative is
examined, focusing on Piaget's theory and its
implications for educational practice. The study
concludes that a constructivist view provides a more
adequate conceptual and pedagogical model for
understanding the exceptional functioning of disturbed
children. It is maintained that this position serves
as an effective alternative to the dominant behaviorist
paradigm.
vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As a part of the general movement of the past two
decades which has given significant social and legislative
attention to children with special needs, there has been a
rising concern about children who are emotionally disturbed
(Safford, 1978; Cruickshank, 1980). Such children are
characterized by excessive behavior that is inappropriate
to situation and age, and is persistent or chronic. While
the degree of severity of this behavior disorder and adaptive
impairment may vary, there are typical constellations of
interrelated symptoms. There is, for instance, a serious
difficulty in establishing contact with peers and adults; an
impaired sense of identity that inadequately distinguishes
self from others; a distorted perception of reality and a
resistance to environmental change; an apparently irrational
level of anxiety accompanying a demonstration of innappro-
priate feelings, a pervasive mood of depression, or certain
physical symptoms such as speech defects or distorted
motility; and retardation in learning capacity on some
level (s) reflected in irregular academic profiles.
Estimates of the incidence of emotional disturbances
among the school population are influenced by variables of
1
2definition and degree of severity. Many authorities,
however, agree that close to ten percent of all school-aged
children can be classified as emotionally disturbed (U.S.
Office of Education, 1975).
An awareness of the extent of this problem, and the
special educational and therapeutic needs of disturbed
children, has spread among educators, administrators,
researchers and the general public. Concommitently
,
through
parental or interest group pressures and legislative
mandates, there has been a significant allocation of
financial and human resources to assist these children,
thereby increasing the educational provisions and
opportunities of such pupils.
The vast majority of the programs designed to educate
emotionally disturbed children as a part of this recent
effort are governed by a behaviorist approach to teaching
and learning. This model is essentially based on the
principles and prescriptions of B. F. Skinner. In brief,
this approach calls for a systematic study of environmental
conditions which reinforce behavior in particular ways;
these conditions and/or events are then arranged in specific
temporal relationships to the behavior in question. Such
arrangement is based on a measurement system designed to
enable a teacher to identify environmental events which
influence the acquisition, maintenance, strengthening, or
3disappearance of various types of response patterns.
There are voluminous sources in the literature that
attest to the pervasiveness of this behavioristic model as
the conceptual guide for programs educating the emotionally
disturbed (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975; Bullock et al.
,
1974;
Cowan, 1978; Evans, 1975; Fagen et al., 1975; Forness and
MacMillan, 1972; Garwood, 1979; Guralnick, 1977; Hammill
and Bartel, 1975; Harshman, 1969; Hewett, 1974; Koch, 1964,
1971, 1976, 1981; Joynson, 1970; Langer , 1969; MacKenzie,
1977; Marx and Goodson, 1976; Meisels, 1979; Payne et al.,
1974; Rhodes and Paul, 1978; Safford, 1978; Swanson, 1979;
Wedell, 1975; Wyne and O'Connor, 1979).
Statement of the Problem
Despite this major effort to improve the education
of emotionally disturbed children there has been a growing
number of sources in recent years citing serious problems
and inadequacies in such behaviorist programs (Swap, 1974;
Safford, 1978; Wood, 1975; Reid, 1978a; Gallagher and
Reid, 1981; and Langer, 1969)
.
Among the various limitations or deficiencies noted
in regard to these programs, three problem areas appear to
be of central importance. It is proposed here that the
major inadequacies are related to the following program
characteristics: (a) curricula are typically based on a
4limited understanding of the educational and socio-psycho-
logical needs of disturbed children; (b) the goals and skills
selected are short-term in scope; and (c) reasoning skills
and long-term cognitive and emotional growth are under-
emphasized .
This view is corroborated by various students of the
field. For instance, Miller and Dyer (1975) have shown
behavioral educational approaches to be initially effective,
but with decreasing success in the long run as compared to
approaches based on active exploration. Stallings (1976)
supports this contention and further indicates that being
taught certain responses does not ensure that the children
possess the logic to construct similar responses themselves.
In addition to the general epistemological and
educational inadequacies of the behaviorist paradigm
addressed in this study, four specific areas will be con-
sidered in the failure of this approach to provide appro-
priately for the needs of disturbed children;
1. To deal in educational terms with chronic
emotional conflict characteristic of disturbed children;
2. To use error productively within the curriculum,
as well as in the general milieu of the classroom and school
community, rather than merely to avoid it;
3. To elicit active inquiry and cognitive growth; and
4. To foster intellectual, social and emotional
autonomy
.
5Purpose and Significance of Study
In raising questions concerning the adequacy of an
educational approach, it is necessary to appraise critically
both the conceptual/epistemological foundations of the
approach and its pedagogical applications. When this
approach is used with a specific population, it is also
necessary to assess the appropriateness of this derived
pedagogy for the particular needs and characteristics of
that population.
Consequently, this study will assess the conceptual
and pedagogical dimensions of the behaviorist approach as
represented by Skinner, with particular reference to its
adequacy for emotionally disturbed children. After assessing
areas of inadequacy and the particular developmental needs
of this population which are not met by the behaviorist
approach, the study will examine the merits and pedagogical
implications of a "constructivist" alternative to behaviorism
for serving the unmet needs of emotionally disturbed
children. The constructivist alternative will be discussed
primarily with reference to Piaget's formulation of
constructivism.
In considering the prevalent behaviorist approach and
the constructivist alternative, particular reference will
be made to four critical areas and how they are addressed
by the two approaches. These areas are conflict,
autonomy,
6error and active inquiry. These are chosen for two reasons.
As indicated above, they are crucial in the development of
a healthier direction toward growth for disturbed children.
And the ways in which the areas are addressed differ in the
two approaches and highlight their significant epistemologi-
cal and pedagogical contrasts.
In summary, the purpose of this study is to address
the overall question: "What are the conceptual and peda-
gogical limitations of the behaviorist approach currently
predominating in the education of emotionally disturbed
children, and what is the rationale for, and nature of, a
constructivist alternative?"
'In pursuing this overall purpose, the study will deal
sequentially with the following implementing questions:
1. What is the context of behaviorism in intellectual
history, philosophy and the discipline of psychology, and
what are its essential features?
2. What are the epistemological and conceptual
limitations of behaviorism?
3. What are the pedagogical limitations of
behaviorism with particular reference to emotionally
disturbed children and selected learning needs?
4. What is the epistemological and conceptual nature
of constructivism?
5. What is the pedagogical relevance of constructivism
7for the emotionally disturbed, and how might it be applied
to selected learning needs?
The significance of such a study lies in its
combination of a critical assessment of the behaviorist
approach for educating disturbed children, the suggested
emphasis on four critical areas for analytical and
remedial attention, and the elaboration of how such areas
are better handled through a constructivist approach. It
could serve as a frame of reference for curriculum
planners, special education coordinators or teachers,
that differs from the prevailaing behaviorist model.
Even if the constructivist view were not to be accepted
in its entirety, the alternative has value in providing a
new perspective from which to examine the current
curriculum and needs of the emotionally disturbed.
Hopefully, this perspective and body of
recommendations can contribute to learning environments
in which active inquiry is basic, error and conflict are
treated appropriately, problem solving is incorporated
into an individualized and emergent curriculum, and where
increasing social, emotional and intellectual autonomy is
an emphasized goal for disturbed children.
8Scope and Procedure of Study
The term "emotionally disturbed" is used in this paper
to refer to a range of behavior disorders from mild to
severe. It includes children who are pathologically with-
drawn from their environment as well as those who rage
openly against it. For purposes of the study, it does not
include truly autistic children or those whose patterns are
so severe that they could not function outside a residential
placement. Rather, the children of concern here are capable
of living with their families and attending a special day-
school or regular school as main-streamed students or
functioning within the confines of a special needs class.
The issues treated in this study are primarily
epistemological, pedagogical and curriculum-related. Topics
treating the role of the teacher are strongly connected with
these issues, but will be considered beyond the scope of the
study. Nor will there be any attempts to deal directly with
the therapeutic considerations or etiology of pathology in
the children except as they are translated into educational
planning. The study is not designed as an empirical investi-
gation. Rather, the literature will be used to identify
problems inherent in the behaviorist theoretical position
and in the curricular foundation upon which these educational
programs for emotionally disturbed children are based.
This study is based on documentary research, and
is
9essentially designed as a conceptual study. The preliminary
identification, and rationale for selection, of the four
critical areas— as already sketched out— is based on an
introductory survey of the literature and personal profes-
sional experience with emotionally disturbed children.
The analysis of the theoretical nature and differences of
the behaviorist and constructivist approaches, and the
critical examination of their ensuing implications for
curriculum with regard to emotionally disturbed children
are based on primary and secondary sources. Although there
are many other psychologists and educators representing both
behaviorism and constructivism, for the purposes of this
study Skinner and Piaqet will be considered adequate voices
respectively to represent each approach.
Review of the Literature
The major categories of literature relevant for this
study are those of: (a) behaviorist epistemology
and
educational applications of the position: (b)
constructivist
epistemology and its educational applications:
and (c) nature
of emotionally disturbed children and
educational issues or
approaches pertaining to this group.
Behaviorism
The basic primary sources in this
category will be the
writings of B. F. Skinner, with
emphasis on The^echnology
implications of a constructivist epistemology, as do
Cognitive Development (1977) by Flavell, and Theories of
10
Development (1969) by Langer.
The Emotionally Disturbed
The literature in this category addresses issues of
specific psychological and educational relevance to emo-
tionally disturbed children. In some, like Meisel's Special
Education and Development (1979), Garwood's Educating Young
Handicapped Children (1979), and Safford's Teaching Young
Children with Special Needs (1978) , a developmental
perspective is formulated and the child is basically
viewed as an activist engaged with the environment in
cognitive
,
affective and motoric ways , not merely as a
passive responder.
Other workds emphasize a more behaviorist-oriented
perspective, as in the following anthologies: Harshman's
Educating the Emotionally Disturbed (1969), and Wedell's
Orientations in Special Education (1975) . Another
anthology. Educating Emotionally Disturbed Children by
Dupont (1974) , is more eclectic in its approach. Focusing
on disturbed children in educational settings, this
latter
work describes the particular needs of these students
and
offers various strategies for meeting such needs.
11
of Teaching (1968)
,
Science and Human Behavior (1953)
,
and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) . In these seminal
works, Skinner elucidates his behaviorist views, the
essential thrust of which is that rewards, threats and
punishments shape human behavior patterns and that a person's
own actions, as well as the environment itself, bring
consequences which in turn shape behavior. Skinner argues
that "people are not in any scientific sense free or
responsible for their achievements" (Skinner, 1971, p. 125).
In this study Skinner's views will be considered
primarily in terms of their epistemological implications
and their educational relevance. He maintains that "the
principal function of education is to transmit the culture
to enable new members of a group to profit from what others
have already learned. It follows that the principal task
of the student is to learn what others already know"
(Skinner, 1971, p. 149). It is basically a passive system
in contrast to the active nature of a constructivist system.
There have been voluminous quantities of secondary
sources devoted to behaviorism and to B. F. Skinner in
particular. Of these basic sources, those most frequently
used in this study will be Langer's Theories of
Developme_nt
(1969), Carpenter's The Skinner Prime_r (1974),
and Milhollan
and Forisha's From Skinner to Rogersj Contrasting
Approaches
to Education (1972). In addition to such
sources which
12
present, clarify and assess issues within the behaviorist
position, the Seventy-second Yearbook of the National
Society for the Study of Education, which presents an over-
view of behavior modification, is a useful source on current
theories and practices within a behaviorist pedagogy.
Constructivism
Due to the selection of Jean Piaget as the representa-
tive constructivist for this study, primary sources consist
of his works. Piaget's works that most closely address
educational situations and pedagogical perspectives, as
well as those that deal with fundamental psychological issues
which serve as the basis for his educational position, will
be emphasized. These include: Science and Education
(1971b)
,
To Understand Is to Invent (1973) , Genetic Epistem-
ology (1970) , The Psychology of the Child (1969) , and The
Psychology of Intelligence (1950) . Piaget maintains that
active participation is required if the child is to trans-
form the data of his environment and thereby to "know" it.
For Piaget, knowing is an activity of the subject and
knowledge is a construction. Knowledge is neither solely
in the subject (knower) , nor simply in the object to be
known, but instead is seen as constructed by the subject as
an indissociable subject-object relation. Knowledge is
therefore not static, but is active, dynamic and
relational
13
Piaget views the epistemological process as a structuring
of the environment according to underlying subjective
structures, or as a structuring of the subject in living
interaction with the environment. His theory when applied
to an educational setting requires an active, inquiring
student who constructs and transforms, rather than passively
absorbs knowledge.
Three excellent secondary sources on the educational
implications of Piaget's epistemology are: The Impact of
Piagetian Theory by Murray (1979) , Thinking Goes to School
by Furth and Wachs (1975) , and Piaget, Education and
Teaching by McNally (1974) . These books share a common
virtue in deriving clear educational strategies based on
an adequate understanding of the epistemology.
There are a number of books and articles dealing with
issues of conceptual development and cognitive growth which
amplify the foundations of a constructivist approach to
education. A two volume set of such articles, entitled
Knowledge and Development (1977, 1978), edited by Overton,
Gallagher and Easley, considers issues of (a) activity in
Piaget's cognitive theory, (b) the psychological guides
for education according to a constructivist perspective,
and (c) the impact on educational growth of interest and
autonomy. Furth 's book, Piaget and Knowledge (1969)
provides a preliminary theoretical perspective on the
14
Organization of Study
The study is divided into six chapters. Following
this introduction. Chapter II focuses on behaviorism, its
philosophical lineage and place in the history of psychology,
and Chapter III addresses the epistemological limitations
and inadequacies of Skinnerian behaviorism.
In considering the pedagogical limitations of
behaviorism in Chapter IV, the discussion is focused on
educational practices and curricula in programs for emotion-
ally disturbed, including descriptions of the learning
styles and characteristics of that population. This chapter
also deals with the treatment given by behaviorist programs
to the areas of conflict, error, exploration and autonomy.
Constructivism, as represented by the Piagetian
position, is presented in Chapter V in terms of epistemo-
logical foundation and educational implications.
The concluding section, Chapter VI, applies construc-
tivist principles to the education of disturbed children,
again with respect to the four areas described above. It
then suggests needs for further inquiry and development.
CHAPTER I I
BEHAVIORISM: PHILOSOPHICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
The history of behaviorism begins in empiricist
philosophical traditions and unfolds as a major thrust in
the emerging discipline of American psychology. To
understand behaviorism and its powerful influence on
education throughout the last decades it is necessary to
view it against the background of its philosophical
lineage and its place in psychology.
The philosophical forebears of behaviorism, discussed
first in this chapter, are evident but not always fully
acknowledged. They are particularly apparent in relevant
epistemological accounts. Epistomology deals with the
origins and nature of knowledge as well as the nature of the
knower; both of these dimensions are important in construct-
ing a complete philosophical context of behaviorism. A
central link between empiricist epistemology and latter day
behaviorism can be seen in empiricist-inspired "association-
ism"—the view that all complex percepts or ideas are
formed
through simple association. This associationist
frame of
reference was influential among early behavionsts and
in
fact represented an essential element of
Skinner’s thought
15
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throughout his career.
While not acknowledged by Skinner, there are numerous
implicit philosophical positions, in addition to that of
associationism, behind his thought. And either deliberately
or inadvertently he addresses issues that have persistently
occupied philosophers and others in the development of west-
ern intellectual culture. To ignore this de facto connection
with empiricist philosophy and broader philosophical issues
would diminish our understanding of Skinnerian behaviorism.
Yet, formally Skinner takes an aphilosophical stance.
He is explicit in not providing for, or permitting, a
philosophical foundation for his behaviorist inquiry. In
effect, he has presided over a particular twentieth century
version of psycho logy-divorced-from-philosophy . This dis-
association of psychology from philosophy has not always
been the case. Indeed, prior to eighteenth century empiri-
cism, philosophical and psychological issues were essentially
the same, and the development of the scientific frame of
reference in nineteenth century psychology was clearly asso-
ciated with empiricist and later logical positivist philo-
sophies. Nor will the divorce necessarily hold in the
future; as will be seen, there are indications that philo-
sophy may re-enter the field of psychology once again.
But
in Skinnerian behaviorism the explicit exclusion of
philo-
sophy from scientific psychological inquiry is
remarkably
17
pronounced
.
Whether conveyed implicitly or explicitly, this
mixture of philosophical and aphilosophical underpinnings
of behaviorism needs to be acknowledged and examined as
influences
.
The second task of this chapter is to place behavior-
ism in the context of the historical development of psycho-
logy as a discipline. Here the linkages are clearer and
more direct. Skinner explicitly acknowledges his roots in
psychology and the connection of his formulations with those
of earlier psychologists. The behaviorists discussed here
share Skinner's attempt to eschew concepts involving purpose
,
desire, intention, feeling, and so on. Whatever the specific
differences between Skinner and his predecessors, they all
omit consideration of internal events in favor of relating
features of the environment directly to overt behavior.
Building on this discussion of the philosophical and
psychological perspectives behind behaviorism, the third
and final section of this chapter will provide an explica-
tion of Skinnerian behaviorism itself. The basic concepts
and principles of Skinner's behaviorism will be described
separately and in terms of their places in his system as
a whole.
18
Philosophical Background
Behaviorism is an outgrowth and development from the
Empiricist philosophies of Locke and Hume. This seventeenth
and eighteenth century tradition, itself a development from
an Aristotelian system, displays at its core this central
and dominating thesis: a child is born empty—a tabula rasa
,
an open, untouched wax tablet upon which the impinging
environment etches the individual's ensuing history.
This view delineates the notion of mind as copier and
computer; the elements of experience are selected, copied,
organized, stored and processed according to the quality of
the individual's copying equipment as endowed by genetics
and shaped by the environment. Empiricism has spawned many
forms of thought designed to reduce cognitive mechanisms to
a reproduction of reality— a reality having observable
features--and the resulting knowledge is then limited to the
act of transcribing and transmitting the data as carefully
as possible. Human functioning is seen as primarily passive,
being buffeted about by an active environment. Thus, a
developing individual comes to be who and what he is as a
direct result of environmental impact.
The word "empiricism" is derived from the Greek
empeiria
,
from which the English “experience" evolved. The
earliest major philosophical use of empiricism is found in
19
Aristotle, who conceived of experience as the yet unorganized
product of sense perception and memory. Awareness of these
experiences is something that happens to a person. Indeed,
the suggestion of passivity is common to uses of the term
empiricism. Knowledge, then, depends on the senses and what
is discovered through them.
For Locke, the "essences" of things seemed to escape
human knowledge; an external object is finally "an X, I know
not what." It is this philosophical skepticism that fostered
inquiry into the power of reason and awareness of the limi-
tations of human understanding. It encouraged an expansion
of a different sort of knowledge attained through patient
observation and meticulous classification. Therefore, it
was the richness of experience that accounted for information
gained, not a process of rationalizing or coming to the
essences of things. This new focus possessed an added
bonus from a scientist's perspective: it allowed for the
recording of data without the interpretive risk of human
decision, arbitrary judgment or subjective bias.
That Locke is an obvious harbinger of the behaviorists
to come can be clearly seen in his discussions on the
conse-
quences of actions being manipulated for educational pur-
poses. He attempted to formulate laws of thought and
a
model of the mind based on mechanical concepts and
then
applied this to educational issues.
20
According to Locke, without experience there is
nothing left of knowledge of geometry or physics, and there
is no evidence to support innate human knowledge of anything
whatever. Locke was tempted by the newly acquired precision
in natural science and sought a parallel precision for
analytic psychology in which the mind functions as a kind
of Newtonian "empty space" with laws of association deter-
mining the ways in which sensations will be conjoined.
As was true for the behaviorists to follow, Locke was
interested in the avoidance of error while building system-
atically on firsthand experience, beginning with the simplest
ideas and combining them to form more complex notions that
finally serve as the basis for knowledge.* Academic content
,
comprised of multiple items of information were planned by
Locke to be arranged in patterns of association, to be
programmed for maximum coverage and efficiency (Axtelle,
pp. 18-48) . Hume extended Locke's idea of association to
sequences of experience. Ideas of complex occurences stem
from the association of simple events with one another.
The common notion of cause was questioned by Hume as being
neither provable by logic nor witnessed via experience. He
*It is primarily the associationistic bent for which
Lock is remembered and which supplies the historical
beginnings of behaviorism. It is interesting . to note,
however, that he also foreshadowed Dewey in his emphasis
on activity and on the education of the whole person
(Axtelle, p. 236).
21
realized that as functioning human beings individuals do not
doubt the reality of their impressions, but that still does
not imply logical certainty and is of limited use in
philosophy. He continued the endeavor initiated by Locke
that would construct a "science of the mind" through careful
observation and description of ideas and "laws governing
their patterns of association."
Taking Locke's ideas onto a second plateau of empiri-
cism, providing the reducto ad adsurdum
,
Hume analyzed the
process of human thought in the same fashion as he analyzed
the objects of that thought. Thus, thought patterns were
artifically constructed to conform to the nature of physical
objects—an equation of thought process with object
processes
.
The empiricist view of mind is essentially analogous
to a mirror, reflecting sensations from the environment;
the 'source of mental "events" in the mind is always directly
and simply attributable to stimulation from the external
world. The role of the subject-as-actor , constructing
something out of the raw elements of his environment as
they are presented or perceived is largely ruled out.
Empiricism necessarily requires a physicalist view of
the world in which "mental" acts are considered unacceptable
or translated and reduced to physical occurrences. This
aspect of empiricism establishes an environmentalistic
22
assumption that mental occurences or psychological phenomena
are like any other natural event, a part of the physical
world or at least are reducible to physical terms in order
to be meaningful.
Three essential ingredients of this philosophical
model are: (a) that the mind can be analyzed into some form
of constituent elements or building blocks such as impres-
sions or associations and that the appropriate connections
can be discovered; (b) that external forces are impinging
on the relatively passive organism. Thus Locke and Hume
argued that knoweldge has its source outside the individual
and that it is internalized through the senses; and (c)
that the individual passively absorbs and accretes these
impressions
.
Skinnerian behaviorism is a direct descendant of the
empiricist tradition. Skinner has inherited the mantle of
Locke and Hume, but with a shift of emphasis from sense
impressions to behavioral reaction. Still the focus is on
the individual's reaction to environmental stimulation.
While there is clearly an advance in scientific methodology
within the modern form of empiricism, the basic thrust
remains
.
Behaviorism in the History of Psychology
Thorndike and Pavlov exerted great influence on the
early 20th century development of the field of psychology
and paved the way for subsequent classical conditioning
advocates such as Watson. While it is true that for
thousands of years practices of reinforcement were invoked
to change and determine conduct, it was in the twentieth
century development of psychology that a more scientific
formulation of this ageless concept began. Its major
statement is reflected in E. L. Thorndike's law of effect
which maintains:
Of several responses made to the same situation,
those which are accompanied or closely followed
by satisfaction to the animal, will, other things
being equal, be more firmly connected with the
situation, so that, when it recurs, they will be
more likely to recur; those which are accompanied
or closely followed by discomfort to the animal,
will, other things being equal, have their
connections with that situation weakened, so that,
when it recurs, they will be less likely to recur.
The greater the satisfaction or discomfort, the
greater the strengthening or weakening of the
bond (Thorndike, 1898).
Not only was Thorndike's a more precise formulation of this
pleasure principle, it was also based on the more solid
ground of experimental data.
The subsequent refinements in reinforcement theories
have largely been designed to eliminate mentalistic
connec-
tions either by reducing the reinforcement
concepts to the
biological processes connected with physical
needs or by
disallowing generalizations, permitting only the bare
laboratory facts to obtain.
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Watson suggested a focus on the behavior of organisms
,
a focus which would depend directly on sense data. He
introduced a form of behaviorism which rejected as mystical
all behavior not characterized by observability, or any
activity not reducible to a statement of physical responses.
Watson's behaviorism focused upon the characteristics of
various stimuli producing certain responses, not upon the
organism's experience of those stimuli. One result of such
a focus is the avoidance of mind-body connections and all
related philosophical problems raised by these connections.
He was careful to emphasize that his approach did not rule
on the presence or absence of consciousness, mental acts or
private, internal events. His intention was to change the
focus of his emerging discipline to an examination of
observable behaviors. A secondary effect of this focus
allowed for a consensus to be formed among investigating
psychologists working in different contexts because the
material was comprised of observable, replicable behaviors.
Watson objected not only to mentalistic frames of
reference which depended heavily on introspective inquiry,
but he also vehemently attacked the contemporary emphasis
on instincts as explanation for motivation. He objected to
the assumption that these instincts were innate, mentalistic
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and unlearned, that they simply unfolded from within when
opportunity called them forth. He denied the inheritance
of mental abilities, personality traits or even predispo-
sitions .
At the forefront of the movement to change to an
aphilosophical orientation, he rejected the functionalism
of William James— a heretofore powerful influence in the
field—and sought the institution of psychology as a
mechanized, objective science.
Watson's behaviorism sought to sever any last
remnants of the relations of psychology to
mentalism and philosophical concerns. Philo-
sophical terminology was abandoned . . .
American psychologists . . . were eagerly
studying the overt behavior of human and beast,
manipulating them by applying some type of
stimulus to the organism and recording the
ensuing response (Sexton, 1978, p. 8).
Elements of shared enterprise among Watsonian,
Pavlovian and later forms of behaviorism are: (a) theoreti-
cal parsimony, (b) a bent toward practical applications,
(c) overwhelming emphasis on reductive analyses of human as
well as animal conduct, (d) strict adherence to an associa-
tionistic, empiricist frame of reference, (e) rejection of
mind-body distinctions, and (f) the thesis that behavior
appearing to be the result of mental activity could be
explained behaviorally
.
Hull, for example, attempted to reduce psychological
processes to a kind of biophysics. Behavior was seen as a
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means of allowing an organism to resist, remove or alter
those conditions which disturb its homeostatic state. A
stimulus is always physical in his system. Hull employed
an objective stimulus and response analysis of behavior and
constructed a classical postulate system which served as a
theory. He used this theoretical system to found his notion
that no theorem's deducation would be facilitated by the
inclusion of mentalistic postulates such as consciousness
(Hull, 1942)
.
This developing trend in psychology had not yet made
its impact on education. The publication of Burnham's The
Normal Mind (1924) did much to bring about the connection
with education and to create a bridge between the two
disciplines. He maintained that education consisted of:
(a) the selection and description of a task, (b) a plan of
action designed to complete the task, (c) freedom to operate
according to plan, and (d) the introduction of small incre
mental steps with little chance for failure in order to
condition a positive student response to school tasks.
The subsequent decades, through the forties, witnessed
a refinement of conditioning techniques and a broadened
application of the principles established in the research
of the twenties. There was at this time a tendency to
move
from negative to positive reinforcement as the
effective
change agent in operant conditioning.
Later, in the fifties, there was an intensified
upsurge in behavioral research resulting largely from
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Skinner's burgeoning influence. This heightened activity
provided the impetus for developing techniques and
approaches to be utilized in education and medicine as
well as in psychology. At the time this research was
initially conducted, proponents on both sides of the
"rationalist-empiricist" controversy agreed on the necessity
of experience in the acquisition of behavior. But the
Skinnerian approach included a determination to proceed
as if experience-based conditioning was both necessary
and sufficient to explain growth of behavior.
The sixties witnessed an intensified emphasis by
psychologists on the connection between the child and his
learning environment. A systematic approach ushered in a
replacement of the haphazard techniques applied to learning
environments in previous research and practice. This
orientation with its research findings applied to areas of
child management, motivation and classroom discipline
became the dominant trend in psychology.
From the 30s, through the period of time described
above and into the current scene, Skinner has increasingly
influenced the field on both practical and research levels.
His view of behavior is that it results from environmental
influences, and cognitive events are de-emphasized if not
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ignored. Moreover, in this behaviorist view, development
itself is considered a learning process, the study of which
is effected by analyzing the situational conditions that
are antecedent and consequential to the behavior question,
as well as the contingency relationship between the behavior
and its consequences (Berman, 1978)
.
A major change in the Skinnerian version of behaviorism
is the attempt to remain atheoretical
,
to avoid any "explana-
tion of an observed fact which appeals to events taking
place somewhere else, at some other level of observation,
described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in
different dimensions" (Skinner, 1950) . Skinner has refused
to "biologize" the concept of reinforcement.
He has refused to explain what makes reinforcers
reinforcing . . . and resisted the temptation to
invoke homeostatic notions, notions of 'tissue-
need' drives, wants, hungers and the like . . .
Accordingly, the laws of behavioral psychology
are no more than that collection of reliable
functional relationships resulting from the
experimental analysis of behavior (Robinson,
1979, pp. 128-129) .
The Skinnerian approach is to utilize "operational
definitions," excluding terms not based on observation and
measurement. Reinforcement, for example, is seen in terms
of probability of a given response.
Only the actual measurements of these probabilities
permits us to treat a stimulus as a reinforcer.
That is, there is no a priori classification of
stimuli as reinforcing or non-reinforcing. Put
another way, there is no deductive element in
Skinner's system (Robinson, 1979, p. 129).
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Skinner argues that the facts of behavior survive
regardless of any discoveries in physiology or neuro-
physiology. Like associat ionist ic theories occurring
ear ^^ e:i- ^-n the history of psychology, the Skinnerian
perspective judges the organism as "empty," another kind
of blank slate upon which the environment etches. Skinner's
aim is to establish functional relationships between
behavior and environment independently of knowledge accruing
in related fields of inquiry. He holds that "a complete
behavioral analysis, leading to functional laws can be
conducted without reference to the physiology of the brain,
the passions of the animal, or the strivings for succes and
happiness" (Robinson, 1979, p. 130).
Skinner's psychology, then, contains a synthesis of
elements and characteristics from associationist
,
behavior-
ist, environmentalist and determinist positions. It repre-
sents the alignment of philosophical and psychological
threads tied together in an atheoretical but amalgamated
fashion; it encompasses a rejection of grand systematic
thinking, and the exclusive utilization of empirical,
observational data-gathering . The Skinnerian system repre-
sents also a culmination of the many textures being woven
through the field of psychology from the turn of the
century to the present.
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Skinnerian Concepts and Principles
Skinner's epistemological perspective, as indicated
above, is not based on a carefully formulated theoretical
position. Indeed, he rejects any formal philosophical
stance. Nevertheless, he has been greatly influenced by the
empiricist philosophical tradition and, like Locke and Hume,
sees association as the basis of knowledge. For Skinner,
learning proceeds as an accretion of encounters with
stimuli, progressing from simple elements to more complex
units of knowledge. Locke and Hume viewed knowledge as
utilizing the same building blocks: simple sensations give
rise to simple ideas which can be rearranged to form more
complex ideas.
This principle of association in the Skinnerian system
is assumed
to govern not only the organization of (a) stimuli
in the external environment and (b) the impressions
left by these stimuli upon the person, but also
(c) the responses of the person to these impres-
sions and (d) the response habits (tendencies)
acquired by the person. Elements in the external
environment are presumed to be there in a state
of natural association (Langer, 1969, pp. 54-55).
Skinnerian behaviorism includes the following tenets:
1. A materialistic view of the functioning human
being and a concommitant rejection of mind-body dualism,
2. A belief that private and public events are
functionally similar and are amenable to influence by the
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same learning principles,
3. A rejection of explanatory frames that are
mentalistic
,
4. A belief that the immediate environment is the
primary determinant of behavior,
5. Employment of scientific methods emphasizing
systematic observation and control of behavior.
6. A rejection of trait labels in favor of more
specific observation of particular behaviors, and
7. A predisposition toward amassing laboratory data
without developing elaborate theoretical constructs and
generalizations
.
Skinner is particularly influenced by the empiricists
in his quest for explanations based on observability and in
rejecting the notions of inner causes. Indeed, Skinner
undertakes to make observation the sole index describing
human thought
.
The System and Methodology
The basic premise underlying Skinnerian psychology
is
that organisms are basically acted upon by the
environment.
Thus
,
ie assumption is that the child is born
dependent
Don the environment, which provides the ^
C(
r^
s
^
Y
timulation to provoke him to respond if he
is to
urvive and adapt. In this the child is
like a
achine which must be set in motion by an
outside
orce. In this sense, the environment
does not
onstitute the scene of (or occasion for)
the
child's behavior. Rather, it is the dominant
actor in the drama of his life (Langer, 1969,
p. 64) .
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Skinner's methodology is based on a positivistic
perspective, stressing functional and quantifiable relations
gleaned from persistent observation and recording. The
method emphasizes the operationalization of variables and
their systematic manipulation to test hypothesized relation-
ships between behavior and environmental events. "Skinner
believes this role is the only and the total task of
scientific inquiry" (Wolman, 1981, p. 125).
Skinner's method, essentially an inductive one, begins
with empirical data and gradually, if at all, builds toward
tentative generalizations. It implies a general rejection
of classification systems considered by Skinner to be super-
fluous in the effort to change or redirect a particular
piece of behavior. His method incorporates the assumption
that neither mental events nor internal states and processes
are relevant to a proper study of behavior; such a study
can be successfully accomplished without dependence on such
information. Sufficient variables lie outside the organism,
immediately available for observation and study, or can
be
obtained from environmental history so that adequate
scientific analysis can be carried out with reference
only
to these.
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The Principles and Elements
From laboratory investigations based on this methodo-
logical approach, Skinner developed a series of principles
or components that are central to his system. The following
elements, which build upon the earlier empiricists and
behaviorists
,
are marked by Skinner's particular emphasis.
Respondent Behavior /Respondent Conditioning . According
to basic behaviorist tenets, respondent behavior is elicited
unconditionally by some known and observable stimulus. It
is essentially reflexive behavior, not subject to volitional
control. Associated with this behavior is a directly
related form of conditioning: respondent conditioning, of
which the classical Pavlovian conditioning is the prototype.
A new stimulus is paired with one previously eliciting a
particular response and after a given number of repetitions
the response is also elicited by the new stimulus.
Skinner accepts the importance of this behaviorist
principle only insofar as it explains the process by which
new stimuli come to elicit old responses. He maintains,
however, that this form of conditioning has little impact
on human behavior nor does it explain how new responses
are acquired.
Operant Behavior /Operant Conditioning . Within the
Skinnerian framework, operant behavior and conditioning are
the critical factors in the dynamics of human functioning.
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Operant behavior is roughly equivalent to voluntary behavior.
It operates on the environment to generate consequences.
It is this behavior which serves as the primary focus of
Skinnerian study designed to assess how this behavior changes
in response to variations occurring in the environment.
Operant conditioning is the controlling behavior in
reaction to consequences produced. There is a significant
difference between this operant conditioning and the classi-
cal conditioning of earlier behaviorists . Both acquire a
relation to previous stimuli, but in operant conditioning
the prior stimulus becomes the occasion for the operant
behavior, but is not an eliciting stimulus. The antecedent
becomes the cue for the emission of an operant response,
its actual occurence depends on a complex variety of
conditions. But it is not the cue-response connection that
is important. Rather, the emphasis is on the response and
how it is reinforced.
It is often the functional status that renders a
behavior operant or respondent. For example, a newborn
infant emits cries as orimary reactions to hunger or
other
physical discomfort; that same infant in time uses
the
behavior differently— as a distress signal for help
which
has been answered in many instances before.
This latter
form of crying is dependent on consequences
ensuing in the
environment and is then considered operant
.
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Skinner's approach, then differs from earlier
behaviorists primarily in this emphasis on response
consequences rather than their antecedent stimuli. In
what he feels is the absence of knowledge regarding the
controlling stimuli for most behaviors, Skinner proposed
this operant paradigm which affords a practical system
easily applicable to problems of human life.
Thus Skinner revises Thorndike's Law of Effect as
follows: "Instead of saying that a man behaves because of
the consequences which are to follow his behavior, we simply
say that he behaves because of the consequences which have
followed similar behavior in the past" (Skinner, 1938,
p. 87) .
Reinforcement According to Skinner, the agency that
shapes behavior is the process of reinforcement. It is the
necessary element in developing and maintaining a discrimin-
ated operant. A reinforcer is determined by its effect upon
response emission. For Skinner, a stimulus becomes a rein-
forcer if it increases the probability of a response. That
is, it becomes a reinforcer for similar responses emitted
in the future and prediction can be made based on the
increasing frequency of the behavior
.
Thus, when reinforcement follows a given act or piece
of behavior, the frequency is likely to increase given
Skinner also interprets this the othersimilar conditions.
way around: any piece of behavior occurring with some
frequency is assumed to have been reinforced.
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Skinner admits that human action is too complex to
make simple connections between cause and resulting action.
Instead of dealing with cause and effect he attempts to
identify functional relationships between the environmental
conditions and changes in the frequency of specific actions.
His emphasis is placed on how behavior is modified in rela-
tion to environmental feedback, i.e., in relation to the
kind, intensity, and frequency of reinforcement.
Positive Reinforcement involves the providing of
something desirable to the learner, such as food, money or
praise in order to increase the probability of a given
behavior's recurrence. A consequence that is pleasantly
rewarding to the learner in some way increases the possi-
bility that the behavior which produced that particular
response will be repeated.
Negative Reinforcement , contrary to popular under-
standing, is not identical with punishment. It is the
removal of aversive, uncomfortable or unpleasant stimuli,
resulting in the increasing frequency of the behavior so
reinforced. An individual discovers through experience that
he can escape from an uncomfortable situation by exhibiting
certain behavior. Having discovered the consequence of
escape, the learner is likely to repeat the behavior
whose
consequences led to the absence of the unpleasant or
negative reinforcer.
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Punishment . Skinner views punishment in two ways:
(a) as the presentation of aversive stimuli or negative
reinforcers, and (b) as the removal of positive reinforcers.
He distinguishes between the removal of positive reinforcers
to extinguish a response and the withdrawal of a reinforcer
when contingent on a response. Only the latter is punish-
ment .
Skinner considers the use of punishment generally
inefficient. He proposes instead that society adopt
measures of positive reinforcement which are both more
efficient and effective. In his view punishment tends to
suppress behavior, not change it. The desirable effects
of applying punishment are usually short-lived while the
undesirable effects, such as anxiety and unhappiness, are
often prolonged.
Schedules of Reinforcement . The environment yields
rewards in many varied patterns , with changes over time
and according to situation. Skinner has thoroughly investi-
gated these schedules, or arrangements of reinforcements,
to determine their influence on behavior.
One such arrangement is continuous reinforcement,
which represents a one-to-one correspondence between a
particular response and a rewarding consequence. It is
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primarily the physical, mechanical aspects of human
environment which can be characterized as reinforcing in
this manner. Devices and appliances fall into this
category in which appropriate function (or reward) is
expected every time. The higher incidence of consistency
in the physical world, as opposed to the human social
context, accounts for this kind of reinforcement. Skinner
has found that this continuous reinforcement has a disad-
vantage of producing extremely low frustration levels and
concomitant lack of perseverance in the subjects so
reinforced
.
An alternative pattern of reward is intermittent
reinforcement
,
which does not reward an appropriate act
every time one occurs. The social environment or human
sphere of influence tends to reward more unevenly, more
erratically than the physical environment. The occurence
of reward is difficult to predict because the contributing
factors are highly complex and dynamic.
There are specific varieties of intermittent rein
forcement, based on the dimensions of the interval between
reinforcements and number of occurences. A fixed-interval
schedule is one in which reinforcement occurs at standard-
ized intervals, e.g., every five minutes, or every six
weeks. A variable-interval schedule reinforces at unstan-
dardized and irregular time periods. A fixed ratio
refers
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to a schedule which reinforces regardless of time elapsed.
In contrast, variable- ratio refers to the reinforcing of
responses in varying groups, e.g.
,
after the first two
responses, after the sixth, the twentieth, etcetera.
Skinner and his colleagues have examined these
varieties of intermittent reinforcement in detail (Ferster
and Skinner, 1957). Each variety and its combination with
another has been found to have predictable effects on the
frequency of operant responses. For example, the fixed-
ratio schedule tends to increase persistence and maintain
uniform response rates; the variable-ratio produces even
greater perseverance with greater extinction resistance.
Under a fixed- interval schedule, work output does not remain
constant; under a variable-interval schedule, the effect is
a high and consistent rate of response, with persistence
over time.
There is then a generalized notion of the contrast
between continuous and intermittent reinforcement , and
their effects in practical application. "The continuous
schedule is important in acquiring new behavior. But the
intermittent schedules are necessary for building response
strength " (Carpenter, 1974, p. 31). Skinner's discovery of
this relationship derives from his empirical investigations
and consequent application to the experiences of
daily life
f this relationship affords greaterThe recognition o
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efficiency in the use of behaviorist techniques.
The primary tool in the Skinnerian repertoire is
differential reinforcement
,
which occurs when small changes
in performance produce a significantly different outcome.
It is the mechanism of shaping through successive approxi-
mations that gradually leads to refinements in skilled
behaviors. This process can be analyzed into six basic
steps: (a) identification of an effective reinforcer,
(b) specification of acceptable steps toward that target
behavior, (c) selection of an approximate current response
to reinforce temporarily, (d) withdrawal of reinforcement
once the approximate behavior pattern stabilizes, (e)
selection of a closer approximation after behavior has
become more variable again, (f) extinction of this new
response in favor of a still closer approximation, and so
on until target behavior is achieved. Skinnerian use of
this form of reinforcement has been widely publicized via
pigeon ping-pong.
Control . Psychology's task, according to Skinner, is
to predict and control behavior, to generate an effective,
efficient methodology with which to accomplish this assign-
ment. He believes controls are constantly functioning
in
any case, so that a more thorough understanding and
enlight
ened harnessing of these controls will result
in better
conditions of life (Skinner, 1953 , p. 17 ).
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The thesis of Beyond Freedom and Dignity is that a
science of human behavior must be developed, one which will
transcend the teleological, "pre-scientif ic " thinking so
objectionable to Skinner. The environmental control
exacted on human behavior should be acknowledged and its
beneficial aspects encouraged, i.e., seeking the positive
reinforcers within this control (Skinner, 1971). The
primary aim of his behavioral science is the same prediction
and control brought to bear by the hard sciences.
Skinner maintains that human society can, in this
modern age, no longer afford to ignore the controlling
environment, that an attempt must be made to develop
systematic control over those conditions and circumstances
that shape human behavior
.
CHAPTER III
BEHAVIORISM: CRITIQUE OF
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Before analyzing the appropriateness of behaviorist
pedagogy for the particular needs of emotionally disturbed
children, it is first necessary to assess the soundness of
the conceptual framework out of which that pedagogy is
derived. After presenting a brief overview of major
criticisms, the chapter will discuss a series of limitations
in orientation and concept that characterize this formula-
tion.
Overview
The weaknesses of Skinnerian behaviorism lie, first
of all, in its epistemological limitations. It has failed
to provide any real philosophical foundation for its
enterprise or to elucidate any but the narrowest conception
of science as a process. A related problem is its failure
to recognize in its own functional framework a difference
from the other "hard" sciences with regard to subject
matter. In psychology man is both the inquirer and often
the ultimate experimental subject. The significance of
this relationship is ignored by Skinner, as is the inter-
active dynamic between the two roles, and between man and
his environment generally.
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In emulating physics and biology, Skinner has
restricted admissability of evidence with a greater
intensity than his models. He has honed the criticism of
"observability" until its sharp focus rules out much that
is relevant in the study of human behavior.
Skinner's preoccupation with amassing detailed data
and avoiding theory, as if he were emulating the sciences,
results in significant problems. Transferring his data
gleaned from animal research to applications regarding
human behavior is done on tenuous grounds with concommitent
problems concerning the issue of human behavior.
Finally, the failure of a behaviorist system
adequately to account for the complexity of human behavior
is the most all-encompassing criticism, one which, in the
ultimate analysis, might prove most significant.
Rejection of Philosophical Foundations
Behaviorism has, from the inception of its influence,
been more concerned with its qualifying as a science than
with determining its own broad range of significant subject
matter or its appropriate rationales and philosophical
bases for selecting that subject matter. Its history has
been largely a matter of emulating the methods, forms, and
symbols of the established sciences, especially physics,"
while actually retreating from the task of constructing
its own discipline "and forming rationales for so doing
which could only invite further retreat" (Koch, 1961, p
629) .
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The retreat continued. The dramatic split between
psychology and any philosophical or theoretical under-
pinnings intensified. Sexton (1978) views this alienation
from philosophy as a restriction of psychology's true
growth as a human science. In its effort to conform to
overly narrow conceptions of its enterprise, Skinner's
psychology has paid a great price: a loss of direct
contact with human experience in a larger pattern of
relationships and complexities and a fostering of the view
that scientific psychology must be reductionistic
.
"Individual experience was either ignored or reduced to
something else. It became so totally objectified that the
person whose experience it was, was ignored" (Sexton, 1978).
Philosophers themselves have reinstated much of what
was initially rejected in the positivist era of influence
which Skinner continues to maintain. Carnap, as a leading
positivist, admitted that
although many of the alleged results of intro-
spection were indeed questionable, a person's
awareness of his own state of imagining,
feeling, etc., must be recognized as a kind of
observation, in principle not different from
external observation, and therefore as a
legitimate source of knowledge, though limited
by its subjective character (Carnap, in Feigl
and Scriven, 1956, pp. 70-71).
Skinner's lineage from the empiricists and positivists
,
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then, continues unabated and virtually untouched despite
the disaffection of scientists and philosophers alike
who now reject these restrictive bases for their own
disciplines. Skinner's behaviorism "is thus in the
unenviable position of standing on philosophical founda-
tions which began to be vacated by philosophy (itself)
almost as soon as the former had borrowed them" (Koch,
1964, p. 5)
.
Another critic of the objectivist thrust in behavior-
ism is R. B. Joynson, who finds in its record not a
scientific advance but an intellectual retreat. According
to Joynson, behaviorism has either repeatedly failed to
restrict its inquiry to the external conditions it respects
or has attempted to include internal conditions via
indirect methods . In either case , the results are
inadequate. Furthermore, if behaviorists choose to await
advances in neurphysiology on which to found its experiments
,
as Skinner often indicates, what difference will they
claim for their endeavor to distinguish it from neuro-
physiology itself? (Joynson, 1970) . Waiting for such a
future enterprise is futile— "a future which lifes after
the grave, since that stage is no longer psychology"
(Scriven, 1964, p. 68).
Marx and Goodson (1976) have lent their voices to
They describe the field of psychologythis critical outcry.
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as currently experiencing a reaction to the intense
behaviorist influence exerted over the last decades. They
forecase a growing revival of interest in philosophical
issues and perspectives, a rediscovery of mind and
consciousness—a revival that would correct what they view
as an imbalance created by a rigid behaviorism.
Failure to Recognize Psychology's
Difference from "Hard" Sciences
Skinner ignores the self-referent nature of his
particular discipline. As Scriven (1973, p. 426) points
out, "thinking that p is true never makes it true when p
is a proposition about planets, [yet] the opposite is
often the case when p is about people." This suggests
that Skinner's determination to place psychology parallel
to, say, astronomy or physics will not work because of the
difference in the relationship of inquirer to his subject
matter
.
The inescapable fact is that this belief-
controllability makes man most unlike planets
and atoms. In part, it means that some of
man's internal states which are involved in
his information-processing and information-
acquiring activities and of which he is aware
by his own perceptions of his own brain states
(i.e., introspection) often dominate his overt
behavior, explain it, and even control the
.
truth of predictions about his later behavior.
That is what sticks in Skinner's craw (Scriven,
1973, p. 427)
.
This reductionism with particular reference to its
to human behavior is objectionable to manyapplication
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critics in trivializing the sum of human functioning. It
focuses on small increments, on manageable bits. According
to Maslow, Skinner is "guilty of attempting to define the
whole phenomenon of the human being in terms of the parts
[he] can manipulate well" (Maslow, 1966, p. ix)
.
Skinner refuses to acknowledge the meaning lost in
disallowing a larger picture of human behavior and instead
insists that eventually there will be sufficient accretion
of data to give a whole picture.
Failure to Acknowledge
Interactive Elements
Critics have objected to the obvious lack of inter-
action within Skinner's behaviorist approach, between
subject and object, between the experimenter and the
experimental subject, between the knower and the known,
and between a person and his environment. As Riegel (1978)
views the issue, "the conditioner engages in a lopsided
exchange" in which he is unaware of the mutuality of the
conditioning process. Instead of viewing this process
as a two-way, interactive enterprise, Skinnerians have
typically and uncritically retained their biased and
assymetric form of empirical endeavor.
Because Skinner fails to recognize the power of the
interactive influence, his interpretation of the relation-
ship between experimenter or conditioner and his
experi-
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mental subject assumes unnecessary restrictiveness.
Breger (1969) accuses Skinner of being "scientistic"
rather than scientific in his method of relating
experimenter to subject in such a way as to set the
experimenter up as "objective fact-gatherer."
Between humans and their environment, the reciprocal
sources of influence are separable for experimental
purposes, but in everyday experience, interaction is
evident and the two exert influence concurrently.
Behaviorists have taken this one-sided paradigm to its
extreme in their mapping of what is functionally a
bi-directional process. Environmental control is over-
studied and overemphasized in the behaviorist literature
whereas personal control is essentially neglected.
There has been much data issuing from the field of
biology demonstrating the constant interactions of
organisms with their environment. The relative passivity
which has been imputed to the organism, particularly by
behaviorist oriented researchers, has become less tenable
than ever. It is, then, the clearly demonstrable activity
even in lower organisms that points to a role for man more
active than empiricist/behaviorist orientations have
allowed
.
The exact counterpart of behaviorist empiricism
in biologic theory is a doctrine long since
abandoned by biology itself, not because it was
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wrong in what it maintained but because it
ignored all that has since proved essential
to an understanding of the relations between
the organism and its environment (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1976, p. 25).
There is a certain irony in Skinner's contending
that people are controlled by their environment, then on
the other hand suggesting they redesign their society by
applying principles of behaviorism. "If humans were in
fact incapable of influencing their own actions, they
could describe and predict environmental events but hardly
exercise any intentional control over them" (Bandura,
1974). Thus, because of the capacity for reciprocal
influence which Skinner neglects, people are at least
partial architects of their own destinies and are therefore
more active entities in the process than Skinner is
willing to acknowledge.
Rejection of Explanatory Structures
Skinner's interpretation of scientific inquiry in
psychology proves more restrictive than that utilized in
the "hard" sciences he seeks to emulate. Physicists and
biologists might replace inner state explanations whenever
possible with more quantifiable explanations, but they do
not automatically reject what might be meaningful, produc-
tive information simply because it is not quantifiable.
Moreover, there are many examples in these "hard"
sciences where inner states are invoked as significant
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explanatory aids. Biology, for example, commonly uses the
notion of self-regulation which Skinner would reject as
untenable in psychology. He has essentially ignored the
use of such terms in other fields and instead tends to see
such "internal" concepts as harking back to the pre-scien-
tific, superstitious thinking he hopes psychology will
rise above.
An empiricist-based epistemology cannot explain
adequately the discipline of mathematics which deals
essentially with unobservable features and with cognitive
constructions. It ignores the frequent use in other
fields of linguistic structures, social structures, atomic
structures, mathematical structures, to name just a few.
What Skinner fails to acknowledge is that physical
characteristics and behaviors do not necessarily exhaust
the class of meaningful events (Anderson, 1974; Kuhn, 1970;
Hanson
,
1958) .
"The problem is that as a purely descriptive enter-
prise with official sanctions against biological and
cognitive theorizing, [behaviorism] is not equipped even
in principle to embrace such subjects and processes" as
found in the study of human behavior (Robinson, 1979,
p. 140) .
Skinner suggests that the use of such explanatory
constructs as self-regulation or cognitive structures puts
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an end to inquiry and results in what he sees as incom-
pleteness of explanation. Yet his behavioristic explana-
tion goes no further toward completeness—one can always
question the power of a reinforcer; why is it reinforcing?
Skinner's intense rejection of such constructs is,
of course, throwing out the baby with the bath water.
Contrary to the Skinnerian perspective, science has often
advanced its scope of knowledge by explaining the observable
in terms of the unobservable, e.g., atomic structure.
Skinner assumes that the domain of observability is
rigidly fixed. His blindness in this regard leads him to
repudiate the notion of structural concepts on the grounds
that they are unobservable. But "this policy not only
excludes most of what is usually considered science, but
regulates what is supposed to represent the epitome of
human intellectual achievement to the lowest common denomi-
nator in man's understanding" (Anderson, 1974, pp. 14-15).
The reductionism is the source of voluminous quanti-
ties of criticism from virtually every discipline.
Robinson (1979, p. 138) speaks eloquently of this issue:
"As Skinner . . . has moved beyond the data . . . as he
has attempted to include under the umbrella of the law of
effect the entire range of human activities, the Skinnerian
system has repeatedly foundered and failed." His
reduction
of such functions as language, "insight" and "latent
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learning" to associational principles has "strained the
tether of plausibility."
Critics who attack Skinner for his reductionism are
certainly aware of the importance of analyzing behavior
in assessing complex concepts. It is true, however, that
while a notion like "cognitive structure" cannot be
adequately evaluated without reference to specific behavior,
this does not imply that the structure can therefore be
reduced to behaviors (Anderson, 1974) .
Skinner disclaims these constructs because they are
"mentalistic . " In so doing he confuses the procedures of
science itself with terminology.
He apparently belives that if he rephrases
mentalistic expressions with terminology
derived from the laboratory . . . then he has
achieved a scientific analysis of behavior.
[Yet] it would be hard to conceive of a more
striking failure to comprehend even the
rudiments of scientific thinking (Chomsky,
1971, p. 23)
.
Chomsky views the Skinnerian enterprise as a set of
arbitrary restrictions on "legitimate" theory construction
an unnecessary shackling that physical scientists would
find an intolerable abridgement of intellectual pursuit
(Chomsky, 1971, p. 23).
Limitations of an Atheoretical Stance
Skinner often implies that a rejection of behaviorism
is tantamount to a rejection of Darwinism. A critical
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response to this would include the notion that
the psychological features of human life are
data that a Darwinian theory must be able to
explain. Facts are not eliminated by invoking
a theory unable to account for them. Rather,
theories are rejected when they are unable to
assimilate the facts (Robinson, 1976, p. 408).
According to Skinner, we enter upon theorizing when
we ask "why?"—why a reinforcer acts as such. His own
account of his work procedure suggests a simple following
of a trail wherever it leads, disregarding theoretical
constructs, allowing himself as experimenter to be rein-
forced in one direction of investigation rather than
another by the responses of his rats or pigeons (Skinner,
1959, pp. 80-89; 1971, p. 170). Yet, he assumes order is
there to be found and that inner states are irrelevant (a
prejudice reinforced by his selection of rats and pigeons
and not monkeys or men) . And he does in fact sort relevant
from irrelevant observations by reference to a given line
of inquiry. Furthermore, he generalizes his findings to
other areas of investigation, e.g., social sciences and
education. These practices all possess theoretical, not
simply empirical procedural elements. "In refusing to
admit that this is the case, Skinner's reductionism is
itself reduced to special pleading" (Hill, 1971, p.
239).
Furthermore, his determination to focus solely on
external behavior itself results in the selection
of a
model of sorts— a model which excludes inquiry
into more
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inclusive and enduring phenomenal systems such as
"dispositions , " "personality," "social institutions," etc.
Skinner's comments on these levels of inquiry "imply that
they will only become scientific when the effort is made
to reduct them to itemized accounts of specific overt
responses" (Hill, 1971, p. 232).
Preoccupation with Quantifiable Data
There is a tendency in our modern scientifically-
oriented society to feel comforted that knowledge is
advancing if tables of data are being amassed on a grand
scale. Yet the greatest advances in scientific fields have
come from shifts in perspective, not from the accumulation
of data. Such incrementalism creates a false sense of
progress
.
This emphasis on "incrementalism" combined with
Skinner's aloofness toward meaningful theoretical structure
has resulted in a profession in which the measurement is
emphasized out of proportion to its subject matter.
Related to this issue is "mensurationalism
,
" according to
which the validity of an observation is directly propor-
tional to the accuracy of the measurement (Robinson, 1979,
p. 277) . But have the important advances in science
come
through such tiny, measured increments? The revolutions
of thought sparked by Darwin, Freud, Copernicus or
even
Einstein whose theories were recorded in equations
were
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not significantly couched in terms of incremental observa-
tions or measurement, but rather by totally new theoretical
conceptions in their respective fields.
It is not that what Skinner does is unimportant. It
is rather that it is not all-important. "It will not spell
'truth' no matter how accurate it is; it will not yield a
theory," even though it may figure in assessing one.
"Measurement is an instrument of discrimination, not the
tool of invention" (Robinson, 1979, p. 278).
Skinner has chosen the minor role of measurement,
not a more major one of using measurement to learn some-
thing about nature. Without a cohesive theory, a more
significant role evolving from measuring incremental
changes is unattainable.
The kind of thinking represented in Skinnerian
behaviorism is seen by critics to embody the narrowest
elements and applications of the scientific enterprise.
"It presumes that knowledge is an almost automatic result
of gimmickry, an assembly line . . . regarding knowledge
as the result of 'processing' rather than discovery"
(Koch, 1969, p. 2). Contrasted with intellectual enter-
prises based on the search for meaningful relationships
among elements and ideas, behaviorism appears obsessive
in its focus on such narrow conceptions of inquiry.
Skinner's system fails to account for the full range
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of behaviors in even an impoverished Skinner-box
environment, and can therefore hardly do justice in
accounting for the complexities of human life. Such
important and traditional topics of psychology as
cognition, concept formation, personality and mentation
have been ignored, denied or trivialized.
We have been badly oversold on the classical
experimental model as a means of studying
such central aspects of human psychology as
cognition. Too much evidence—obvious and
available evidence— is ignored because it
fails to conform to our prejudices about
how empirical information arises (Deese,
1969, p. 519)
.
Problems in Transferring Animal
Research Data to Human Behavior
"The main crack in the tight Skinnerian system
occurs when Skinner begins to extend his principles to
behavior beyond the laboratory" via methods of analogy
and extrapolation (Carpenter, 1974, p. 95). First, there
is the question, how far can an analogy be stretched
between animal and human behavior? Skinner's rationale
for the use of analogy is vague at best. More interesting
still is his use of extrapolation, which means to estimate
the value or significance of a variable beyond its known
range. The weakness of operant extrapolation is that
it
tends to underrate the complexity of human learning
as
compared to animal learning. The fact that Skinner
has
concerted effort to identify the variablesnot made any
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that are peculiar to human learning, that is, beyond those
found in the conditioning of rats, places his extrapolations
on rather shakey grounds
.
In transferring research data from animals to humans
Skinner claims two assumptions to be valid: a) the
assumption of environmental generality which asserts that
a Skinner box, for example, is meaningfully representative
of other environments , and b) the assumption of speciea-
tional generality which asserts that a pigeon or a rat is
meaningfully representative of other species. It is the
combination of these two assumptions that forms the basis
for Skinner's extrapolations from his research to situa-
tions of human behavior.
In less rigidly restricted environments, character-
istic of the human experience, "the variability of behavior
becomes so great that the only descriptive generalizations
that can be made applicable throughout the range of
environmental conditions are those so broad and diffuse as
to be practically meaningless" (Mackenzie, 1977, p. 162).
The greater attention by critics is directed at the
specieational assumption (Beach, 1950; Mackenzie, 1977;
Seligman, 1970) . There are major differences in behavior
of different species even in highly controlled
and compar-
able experimental environments, differences
sufficiently
great that there is an observable variability
in behavior.
This refers even to the differences between rats and
pigeons, a difference which compounds when extrapolated
to humans
.
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Langer questions the utility of behaviorist animal
research in its applications to human growth in that it
ignores significant differences that would change an
interpretation of a given piece of behavior. For example,
in Skinner's pigeon ping-pong, people might play to lose
so that each gets reinforced more often or to stop playing
such a silly game (Langer, 1964, p. 61). These options
are clearly not within the pigeon repertoire.
Another aspect of critical response to transfer of
animal to human behavior is the complaint that behaviorism
fails to recognize the rational and intentional elements
of human behavior. In seeking purely observational,
descriptive accounts of human behavior , Skinner ignores
reasons for behavior, the motivation behind an act which
he maintains to be scientifically irrelevant.
Behaviorism fails adequately to account for language,
and to consider this facet of human behavior as essentially
differentiating humans from other animals. "If a study of
mankind does not regard man's possession of language as an
essential difference between man and the lower animals,
then I should not know what was meant by 'essential
(Malcolm, 1964, p. 153)
.
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Inadequacy of Skinnerian
Account of Human Freedom
The extremely important and sensitive issue of human
freedom is a crucial epistemological pitfall for Skinner.
He constructs an adamant correspondence between science
and the lack of freedom on the one hand, and between pre-
science and autonomy on the other. It is by no means an
accepted correspondence within the scientific community
(Koch, 1964, 1971, 1975, 1981; Scriven, 1964, 1973;
Robinson, 1976, 1978; Riegel, 1979; etcetera)
.
In fact, his adamance on this point has itself been
termed unscientific in that he claims science will inevita-
bly show that man is unfree (Skinner, 1971) whereas scien-
tific inquiry dictates that a proposition remain open to
the possibility of disconfirmation (Anderson, 1974)
.
Scriven poses a less trivial and more dignified view
of human freedom, which he defines as one being capable
and able to do something besides what one does. He main-
tains that freedom
dwells within and at harmony with the constraint
of natural and psychological laws. The crucial
question is not whether our actions are proba-
blistically determined, but whether they are
wholly determined by external factors which
override any variation in mental state— in
which case we are not free--or whether one of
the intervening determinants is a mental state
or event such as preferring or choosing (Scriven,
1973, p. 440)
.
The critics of behaviorism who insist that "autonomous
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man" is a meaningful concept are not necessarily maintaining
that man's abilities to deliberate, judge or create are
totally beyond the natural laws and regularities of the
world. They are stating that these behaviors fill everyday
experience and behaviorism cannot adequately account for
them. It is not a question, then, whether man can disregard
physical or natural laws and thereby be autonomous; rather
it obtains that man may be autonomous in disregarding the
laws of behavior as delineated by behaviorists
.
Skinner's notion of freedom is essentially one
focusing on its defensive aspect—that is, the freedom from
unpleasant, undesirable events. As such, it fails compre-
hensively to cover all useful definitions of freedom.
Actions like thinking, deliberating, reflecting are all
unobservable; hence, according to Skinnerian criteria,
they are not usable or meaningful in his system. Never-
theless, they do function as forms of freedom. Creative
freedom, for example, is not based on avoidance or escape
from anything. Rather it is a conscious, deliberate
search for innovative alternatives. It is often pursued
despite the consequences and though it may itself create
more problematic conditions or questions.
Thus, Skinnerian freedom is not broad enough to
account for all kinds of meanings of the term.
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General Explanatory Inadequacy
It is apparent, then, that many critics believe that
neither Skinner's philosophy of science (or lack thereof)
nor his conception of (or at least assumptions about) human
beings is tenable (Anderson, 1974; Koch, 1964; Robinson,
1976, 1979; Riegel, 1978, among others). It is also clear
that most critics find interesting insights and valuable
empirical information ensuing from Skinner's method of
inquiry. There have been important types of applications
based on his studies. It is unlikely that educators or
psychologists would deny the value of some of Skinner's
contributions. All of this, however, does not serve as
justification for Skinner's position as a system of
thought or as a sufficient theoretical point of departure
for practical applications.
It is the contention of the present study that while
the critical appraisals discussed above have merit and
touch on sensitive areas of behaviorism, the most important
critique remains the claim of general explanatory inade-
quacy. The point is not that behaviorism is incorrect,
but that it is inadequate for the task of explaining all
that has been observed about how people learn.
This explanatory weakness of the Skinnerian position
is in part due to its resting on a black-box theory of how
humans work. "Black-box" refers to a procedural system in
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which empirical events are amassed but are not related to
a consistent overarching theory or to an understanding of
the reasons or causes of the events. It is comparable to
an engineer who calculates the tensile strength of struc-
tural members, but does not know why given materials act
as they do. This manner of functioning may, or may not,
be adequate for the successful construction of a building,
but it does not provide a basis for a scientific under-
standing of relevant data or reasons for their occurrence.
When applied to how people learn, observable learning
events are amassed without inclusion of the unobservable
facets or outcomes of the process , without an adequate
theoretical framework for dealing with causation. The
black-box approach explains some things, but not all
things, about learning. It does not provide a truly
scientific basis for inquiry and explanatory analysis,
despite Skinner's protestations of behaviorism's scientific
stance
.
The Skinnerian framework presents difficulty in
explaining some important dimensions of the cognitive
process. For instance, while Skinner acknowledges that
internal processes such as human reasoning exist he hardly
does justice to them. This is partly because the phenom-
enon of human reasoning, and an explanation of it, tends
to be elusive for an approach that allows only empirical
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data. It stems
,
too, from Skinner's tendency to lose sight
of the interaction between reason and experience.
The approach is also problematic for analyzing or
explaining the concept of understanding itself. Deese,
for example, came to reject his own experimental background
upon confronting its inadequacy in dealing with this
concept. He could find no way to link understanding or
interpretation with particular behavior, no way to tie
them to dependent variables or specific measures of behavior.
Yet he notes that
the concept is central to the theory of human
thought, and any attempt to eliminate or ignore
it, in the interest of making psychology
conform to the reputed canons of experimental
inference, is worse than misguided. Such
attempts are responsible for the sterility of
much experimental study of cognition (Deese,
1969, p. 517)
.
In other fields, when laws or theories or positions
fail to account for all the data, they are usually
supplanted by a revised formulation or an entirely
different foundation which more adequately accounts for
the data. In psychology, critics of Skinner have often
turned towards Piaget on these grounds. Thus one critic
claims that Skinnerian behaviorism cannot account for the
intellectual and moral phenomena described by Piaget,
while a Piagetian system of explanation can account for
all behavior described by Skinner (Kamii, 1979) . Kamii
extends this point:
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I have seen many psychologists who changed from
behaviorist or associationist views to a
Piagetian outlook. However, I have never known
a Piagetian who later became a behaviorist.
Once a person understands a more adequate theory
(e.g., the heliocentric theory), he cannot go
back to a more limited outlook (e.g., the geo-
centric theory) (1979, p. 31)
.
Can a conceptual framework that has significant
explanatory limitations be an adequate guide for an applied
pedagogy to meet a broad variety of learning needs?
Beyond conceptual considerations, the answer to this must
take into account the nature of the learners, how the
concepts are applied, and how this serves the critical
short and long term educational needs of the particular
learning group.
CHAPTER I V
PEDAGOGY OF BEHAVIORISM: LIMITATIONS
FOR EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN
When the conceptual foundations of behaviorism are
translated into modes of education and training there are
a range of issues that emerge pertaining to any learner.
Emotionally disturbed children, however, have particular
constellations of characteristics and needs which set them
apart from more normal populations of learners. For
purposes of this study, an assessment of the pedagogical
implications of a behaviorist approach must focus on its
appropriateness for this particular group.
Consequently, the initial task of this chapter is to
summarize some of the major learning characteristics and
problems of emotionally disturbed children that must be
considered in any pedagogical strategy designed to meet
their short and long term needs. Then, after examining
the pedagogical implications of behaviorism in general,
the problems of this approach for serving the needs of
the emotionally disturbed will be discussed. Specific
attention is given to the way behaviorist pedagogy deals
with emotional conflict, autonomy, error and active
exploration. Finally, learning needs unmet by the
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behaviorist approach will be identified.
Learning Characteristics of Emotionally
Disturbed Children
Emotional disturbance is a complex notion; its
meaning is evasive, ambiguous and multifaceted. Shea
(1978) observes that there are as many definitions of the
term as there are writers and researchers who address the
subject. These definitions vary according to discipline,
ideological perspective and the audience for which they
were designed.
Most would agree, however, that disturbed children
typically present an extreme mixture of intellectual,
social and emotional levels of development— a condition
which produces difficulties for both diagnosis and
prescriptive educational planning. Their perception of
the world is often disoriented, vague and confused. Most
reveal a totally inadequate comprehension of space, size,
shape and sequence, and are unable to cope successfully
with the symbols, concepts and abstractions of language
and learning (Fenichel, 1969; Hewett, 1968)
.
There is a connection between the personality
characteristics described in the introductory statement
of this study and the characteristics described here
that
pertain more specifically to learning patterns and
problems. As with the definition of emotional
disturbance
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itself, a portrayal of the learning characteristics or
problems of disturbed children is influenced by the ideo-
logical or disciplinary perspective taken as a reference
point. Since this study is concerned with behaviorist and
constructivist perspectives, characteristics will be viewed
through these lenses.
Perspectives on Emotional Disturbance
Behaviorist theory as applied to emotional
disturbance treats the environmental variables that may
be manipulated and altered to eliminate the unacceptable
behavior. The basic premise is that this maladaptive
behavior was originally learned in response to environ-
mental reward of some kind and is equally amenable to
"unlearning" if appropriate reinforcement and motivation
are provided.
Therefore the behaviorist, in determining the extent
and nature of disturbance in a child, looks to the
environment. He seeks the locus of the condition in the
discrete environments in which the child is functioning,
not within an internal state or process belonging to the
child. Thus behaviorists such as Ullman and Krasner (1965)
find the significance attributed to a given behavior to
be dependent on the social context. They define maladaptive
behavior as not fitting the expectations set up in the
context, not responding to all the stimuli actually
present,
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and not obtaining typical or maximum forms of reinforcement
available to the status of behavior.
Skinner sees the community functioning as a rein-
forcing agent for the maladaptive behaviors: alter the
environmental system of rewards and punishments, and thereby
alter the behavior itself. Thus, there is no need within
his system to delve into the nature of emotional distur-
bance. There are simply practical problems connected with
certain behaviors which can be modified through appropriate
alteration of their environmental impact.
In Skinner's view, maladaptive behavior is controlled
by the consequences of that behavior. Deviant behaviors
are assumed to have been learned in response to inadequate
or inappropriate reinforcement. Such behavior is considered
disadvantageous to the individual and/or the group. If the
more "advantageous" behaviors can begin to be rewarded in
the form of positive consequences following in the environ-
ment and if those pairings are repeated often, then there
will exist a behavior-environment exchange circuit which,
as a result, becomes characteristic of the individual
emitting the new behavior.
Behaviorists stress the modification of maladaptive
behavior in order to increase the probability of success
in, and acceptance by, the environment of the
individual
child. In accomplishing this task, the underlying
core or
causal factors are ignored, as is the concern that the
modification and symptom- removal may only mask the real
problem.
69
One way in which Skinner ignores causal aspects of
behavior is through his notion of measuring frequency of
a given behavior and using the data descriptively. A
disturbed child's behaviors, according to this view, may
be less bizarre as a whole if they occur less frequently.
The focus, then, is on a reduction of occurrences of
maladaptive behavior and an increase in alternative,
desired behavior. As a result, he bypasses inner causes
and emphasizes more normal "appearance."
In summary, the behaviorist perspective on an
emotionally disturbed child's disorder is viewed only in
terms of observable characteristics and is interpreted as
being learned from the environment. The maladaptive
learning is derived from the environmental context and its
importance is assessed in terms of the frequency with
which it occurs.
Constructivists, particularly researchers at the
Piaget Institute, view development—and by extension
emotional disturbance— as a tightly integrated phenomenon
with emotional and cognitive aspects. They maintain that
each aspect is dependent on the other and that the
two
areas must be understood synergistically . "The
emotional
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and intellectual aspects of development cannot be
dissociated, and a study of the dynamics of cognitive
function finds its necessary counterpart in a study of
the dynamics of emotional development" (Inhelder, 1976,
p. 227) .
In addition to the bond between emotional and
cognitive areas of development, Piagetians suggest that
social factors too are intertwined. "The affective and
social development of the child follows the same general
process [as the cognitive development] since affective,
social and cognitive aspects of behavior are in fact
inseparable" (Piaget and Inhelder, 1976, p. 33).
There is also a connection between psychomotor and
emotional areas of development, as suggested by Wyne and
O'Connor: "A developmental view of emotional disturbance
requires that the cognitive and psychomotor domains be
given appropriate attention in any attempt to understand
deviations in the affective domain" (1979, p. 323)
.
There is, then, in the constructivist view of
emotional disturbance, an attempt to structure that view
in a wholistic fashion, to incorporate cognitive, affective,
social and psychomotor aspects of the child's development.
The constructivist frame of reference is a multi-dimensional
perspective, based on an integrated approach to the
functional problems of disturbed children.
Since the Skinnerian view of emotional disturbance
affords no specific explanatory or descriptive picture of
the children other than in relation to the environmental
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contingencies producing the maladaptive behavior, the
learning characteristics and problems of the emotionally
disturbed child that follow are essentially derived from
the constructivist perspective.
Static Modes of Thinking and Learning
Emotionally disturbed children characteristically
display strong tendencies toward static connections with
the objects of knowledge in their worlds. They experience
difficulty in developing operative and transformational
schemes and prefer to cling to a developmental ly regressed,
static and figurative functioning. This extends further
into a pronounced inability to expand their focus from
present observations to an active establishment of connec-
tions with schemes from earlier experience or to make
predictions about future outcomes. Anticipation or
prediction is difficult as is the representation of
spatial transformations.
One aspect of this static functioning is the
inordinate attention to detail which is typical of
disturbed children. They tend to ignore any general
patterns or configurations, and focus almost exclusively
on minute details which are often irrelevant to
the task
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at hand.
Hence there is a general aversion to transformational
aspects of their environment in favor of the static
elements. "These children resisted making inferences from
their own actions, but expected to find their answers in
the empirical aspects of the objects, if only they could
perceive them accurately!" (Reid, 1978, p. 7). Their
tendency is to reexamine, insistently and forcefully, the
static elements of a learning situation even though this
material has proven insufficient to gain the information
or outcome sought
.
These children cannot seem to manage the coordination
of actions necessary for logical structuring of thought.
Instead, each action seems to contain its own separate and
isolated causality (Schmid-Kitsikis , 1976; Reid, 1978a),
without lending any support to the construction of a
generalization or inference that would lead to logical
structuring. Thus they seek out fragments and bring an
atomistic intuition to bear on the task at hand.
This extreme limitation of abilities to transfer
schemes from one situation to another, to generalize,
abstract and draw inferences , has been noted by many
observers. Cowan (1978) further observed a tendency to
cling to past events with a ritualistic fervor; children
often mechanically repeated patterns which may or may not
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have been appropriate in a previous context but were no
longer relevant in a new context.
Research done by Inhelder (1976) has indicated
significant problems for disturbed children in dealing with
probabilistic reasoning of any kind. They cannot seem to
accept or meaningfully process chance phenomena and random
events. Instead, they tend to impart highly subjective
rationales to explain such random occurence as, for
example, the chance patterns in rolling dice or calling
out bingo letters. The children are likely to manipulate
their interpretation of chance data in order to infuse it
with some predictability of their own rigid sort.
The general dominance of static schemes, and thinking
patterns related to them, is seen by Cowan (1978) as the
basic element of their cognitive functioning which is
responsible for ensuing difficulties with object perman-
ence, symbol-referent differentiation, conservation and
perspect ive-taking
.
Assimilation-Accommodation Imbalance
Although all children demonstrate some degree of
imbalance in their assimilation-accommodation continuum,
disturbed children's imbalances have been observed to be
more extreme, fluctuate more quickly, occure more perva-
sively, and last developmentally longer. "The severely
emotionally disturbed exhibit eratic and egocentric
74
behaviors. They tend to assimilate the world to their own
subjective needs rather than to attempt to adapt to reality
and thereby resist accommodation of assimilative schemes"
(Reid, 1978a)
.
Voyat (1978) concluded that the consequence of such
assimilation-accommodation imbalance is a cognitive organi-
zation without regard for external adaptation. Such faulty
organization results in an equilibrium not simply regressed
in a disturbed child, but one that is structurally different
from the normal child.
Disturbed children are frequently described as being
lost in fantasy, out of touch with reality, obsessively
or ritualistic ally preoccupied with a limited range and
interpretation of objects and events. All of these descrip-
tive phrases suggest an overassimilative aspect to their
pathology. The children seem to twist and turn the world,
insisting that it conform to their own inner needs and
interpretations
.
There are overaccommodative aspects to their
pathology as well. They often react to environmental
stimulation in highly distractible and imitative ways.
They may merge with surrounding personalities, lacking an
awareness of personal identity and sense of self.
This pattern of inconsistency and fluctuation in
their assimilative-accommodative approaches to the
world
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is characteristic of the functional imbalance of emotionally
disturbed children. Their social, emotional and intellec-
tual functional discrepancies are concommitant with
imbalances between figurative and operative functioning,
indicating the intricate bond between functional and
structural aspects of development (Cowan, 1978; Reid, 1978a,
1978b)
.
This connection is corroborated in research data
coming from Piaget's Institute in Geneva which describes
"permanent or at least very long lasting assimilation-
accommodation imbalances [in disturbed children] with
resulting imbalance in figurative and operative functions"
(Cowan, 1978, p. 337)
.
This Genevan research further
suggests that the difficulties demonstrated with object-
permanance, symbol-referent differentiation and perspective-
taking can be connected with the characteristic dominance
of static schemes, as described above.
Avoidance Patterns
These children develop intricate and often bizarre
avoidance and withdrawal mechanisms to escape encounters
with physical reality as well as with individuals in their
environment. The theme of avoidance is a pervasive one in
their functional profile; it dominates their activity and
apparently their thought processes as well. It is most
clearly discernable in their reluctance to encounter
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cognitive conflict.
Schmid-Kitsikis (1976) found it impossible to center
or focus disturbed children on the contradictions evident
in the activities in which they were engaged. They might
distort what they see, invent "tall tales" to cover the
contradiction or anthropomorphize an inanimate object to
explain some feature of the contradiction. These reactions,
coupled with digressions and refusals suggest that they
need to dominate the experienced conflict in order to avoid
its impact on them, rather than acknowledge the conflict
and incorporate it into their subsequent strategy-building.
There is often an actual task-distortion on the part
of disturbed children designed presumably to avoid the
conceptual-perceptual conflict which might be deliberately
built into an educational presentation, and presumably to
avoid resulting anxiety. Schmid-Kitsikis (1976, p. 247)
gives an illustrative example. When one of two equal balls
of clay is changed into a sausage shape and a question
posed as to equality of quantity, these children tended
toward a single similar response: most claimed to be
unable to answer unless the two lumps of clay remain the
same. A typical statement was "You can't know before
they're the same."
These children exhibit tendencies to repeatedly
change answers quickly when a problem or question is put
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to them and to contradict themselves with successive
responses. This pattern is quite different from normal
children who might change responses over the course of a
learning experience, absorbing the new possibilities
demonstrated in the material or in peer responses, and
being aware of successive answers as possible corrections.
Disturbed children display no apparent awareness of
the inconsistency nor do they reconstruct answers based on
new data or changes in peer's positions. In the experiment
referred to above, Schmid-Kitsikis (1976, p. 246) describes
such an incident: when a disturbed child was confronted
with two equal quantities of clay, one of which was trans-
formed as he watched, into a sausage shape, he responded,
"Here there is more, and there, there is more." The child
could not be urged to experience any cognitive discomfort
with his responses.
The avoidance of conflict often is displayed in such
failure even to recognize the existence of the conflict.
The children may give fluctuating, inconsistent and self
contradictory responses with no apparent awareness of that
aspect even when it is raised by the teacher or researcher.
Avoidance, then, is a dominant theme in the learning
profiles of disturbed children. They become adept at
tactics which avoid subjecting their interpretations of
the world to the potentially disequilibrating
trials and
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tests of experience. Cowan (1978, p. 341) maintains that
"ultimately, whatever the motivation, continued avoidance
of disequilibrating situations almost inevitably results
in structural retardation and further functional imbalance."
Symbol-referent Confusion
Symbolic function presents difficulties for most
disturbed children. They are confused by the use of
symbols to indicate reality and take the symbols themselves
as some form of reality. For example, the word "snake"
written on a piece of paper could terrify such a child.
Anthony (1965) gives other examples of this tendency
which illustrate that signs, semiotics and language are
often assumed to possess the same degree of reality as the
objects represented by these pictures or words. Another
dimension of this confusion is that desires, images or
dreams are typically not distuinguished from deeds and
actions
.
This symbol— referent confusion can occur in children
who are extremely bright and can give certain standard
indications of a high level intelligence. Schmid-Kitsikis
(1976, p. 247) describes a twelve year old disturbed
boy
who demonstrated a definitional response characteristic
of
a fifteen year old to the word "knife," citing many
func-
tional uses as well as descriptive aspects, after
which he
fell to the floor proclaiming his fear at
pronouncing the
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word
.
Egocentric Perspective
Because these children demonstrate a lack of
differentiation between self and other, between self and
external world, they remain at a developmentally delayed
egocentric level of functioning. This affects their
social, emotional and cognitive areas of functioning.
This aspect will be examined more closely at the end of
this chapter, in the section on autonomy which is affected
as a result of this egocentric perspective.
Impulsivity
Despite individual differences, emotionally disturbed
children often exhibit a similar learning problem of being
unable to delay response or inhibit an immediate reaction
in order to scan memory and experience for possible help
in making choices and decisions.
There seems to be an urgency in their response
pattern. To postpone closure is evidently uncomfortable
for these children; perhaps an immediate answer avoids the
anxiety connected with the risk of trying and the spectre
of possible failure even though it almost ensures an
incorrect, hasty answer.
Impulsivity characterizes their reactions to inter-
personal contact and contact with the physical environment
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as well. Their inability to delay, to analyze and to
reflect accounts for many of the difficulties disturbed
children encounter in an educational setting.
It is apparent from the preceding account of learning
characteristics and problems that cognitive, affective,
social and psychomotor domains are intensely interactive
and that the source of the formulation or distortion of
perceptions and behavior relevant to learning is found
within the child as much as in the environment. It is also
evident that these characteristics and problems of disturbed
children are more deep seated, extreme and intricately
linked than with normal children; hence it is even more
important with disturbed children for an educational
approach to consider tendencies, learning characteristics,
and predispositions as well as outer states and to focus
on the interplay between the cognitive, affective and
other domains.
An additional complexity of educational significance
is that these children are not simply cases of regressed
development but, as seen in the example of the boy reacting
to the word "knife," may be normal or advanced in some
areas of intellectual development. They typically exhibit
an uneven academic profile. On the one hand, they may be
advanced in certain academic areas; on the other their
intense confusions and distortions subvert their functional
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level. This characteristic discrepancy is often revealed
in the occurrence of lower level performance on Piagetian
tasks than on standard I.Q. measures. These children have
often acquired precociously or age-appropriately certain
information and skills, but that material is then
processed, combined and transformed by lower level cogni-
tive structures (Reid, 1978a; Safford, 1978).
Behavior Modification in Education of
Emotionally Disturbed Children
Background
Although there were scattered attempts to apply
Watsonian and Pavlovian concepts of behavior modification
as early as the turn of the century, it was not until the
1960s that this perspective took the educational field by
storm. It was essentially the Skinnerian model which
exerted great influence throughout the field generally and
with specific reference to the subsequently developing
sub-field of special education. For educators of emotional-
ly disturbed children, it was considered a productive and
efficient change from the then influential psychoanalytic
approach. This approach was seen as being diametrically
opposed to that psychodynamic model which many educators
felt was imprecise and time-consuming, required more
technical proficiency than most teachers could
demonstrate,
and afforded only minimal observable change
in the children.
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Thus, the field was readily receptive to an efficient,
effective, practical model that required little clinical,
or therapeutic, training of educators. Indeed, the training
required of teachers was more educationally grounded; it
required becoming familiar with learning theory, developing
an understanding of how reinforcement works, how reinforcers
are selected, how to measure frequency and how to set up
programs
.
The earlier influence of a psychoanalytic approach
emphasized the search for inner causes— a task which
exacted inappropriate demands of educators. Here, too,
behaviorism provided an immediately effective frame of
reference independent of inner causes, focusing on acces-
sible, observable, overt behavior— a much more manageable
task for teachers.
It is easy to understand, then, the appeal of a
system focusing on specific behaviors, immediate feedback,
and more rapidly evolving modification of a given maladap-
tive behavior. Essentially, a more rigid and complex
system of thought with regard to educating emotionally
disturbed children led to and was significantly supplanted
by the simpler, direct, more manageable system of behavior
modification.
The psychoeducational approach ironically and inad-
vertantly paved the way for a behaviorist methodology
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which would achieve the goal of supplying an external
framework of stability prescribed by the advocates of a
psychoanalytic approach (Safford, 1978; Wyne and O'Connor,
1979; Hewett, 1974) to counter the children's loosely
organized personal structures. As described by Fenichel
(1969) the children were seen to be disorganized, needing
someone to organize their world for them, to protect them
against their fear of losing control, to help them resist
their impulses. The psychoanalytic group advocated an
educational approach in which the teacher would be the
center of a highly directed, tightly organized setting
designed to apply from without a system of order and
stability upon the children's chaos and disorganization.
Behavior modification advocates continued to place the
teacher at the center of curriculum and reinforcement but
rejected all notions of inner needs or causes.
General Introduction
Behavior modification can be viewed at its most basic
level as a form of teaching by means of extrinsic or
external reinforcement. It is the functional, educational
application of a learning theory—behaviorism- -that focuses
on overt behavior and de-emphasizes "mental" or intra-
psychic events. It functions within the field of
education
as a kind of behavioral engineering and is
considered the
practical outgrowth a "a crusade in the name of
empiricism,
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materialism or mechanism" (Scriven, 1973, p. 422).
It is a process in which target behaviors are deter-
mined, usually by the teacher, delineated in terms of
observable behavior, and based on a systematic application
of the learning theory derived from experimental research.
The successive approximations of the target behavior
already occurring are rewarded, responses not approximating
that desired behavior are ignored, punished or negatively
reinforced. Behavior modification is, then, a systematic
arrangement of environmental events organized to produce
a specific desired change in observable behavior (Swanson,
1979; Haring and Phillips, 1972).
A behavior modification program designed for
emotionally disturbed children is based on the following
assumptions ; that maladaptive behavior is the problem,
not a superficial representation of the problem, and that
because a maladaptive behavior is a function of its
consequences in the environment, it can be altered by
modifying the consequences currently acting as reinforcing
agents . It presupposes planned observation and measurement
in order to accomplish this.
It is important to note at the outset that many of
the following criticisms applied to behavior modification
programs are valid only with regard to particular appli-
cations. In those cases, it is not necessarily a
short-
coming of the behavioral principles which underlie the
program, but possibly a faulty interpretation of those
Skinnerian principles or a badly planned program.
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However, the overwhelming majority of all programs
or descriptions of approaches examined in this study
possessed some or all of these critical flaws (Andrews,
1970; Baer et al, 1973; Bijou and Baer, 1961; Breger, 1969;
Buckholdt and Gubrium, 1980; Catania and Brigham, 1978;
Chadwick, 1971; Fagan, 1975; Forness and Macmillan, 1972;
Hammill and Bartel, 1975; Hanley, 1970; Haring, 1972, 1974;
Harshman, 1969; Hewett, 1974; Hewet et al., 1969; Hilts,
1974; Honig and Staddon, 1977; Hughes, 1980; Kamii, 1971,
1979; Krumbolz, J. and Krumboltz, H., 1972; Mackenzie,
1977; Madden, 1972; Mann and Phillips, 1971; Miller and
Dyer, 1975; Morreau and Daley, 1972; Poteet, 1973; Ramp and
Hopkins, 1971; Safford, 1978; Shea, 1978; Skinner, 1968,
1973; Ullman and Krasner, 1975; Wedell, 1975; Wyne and
O'Connor, 1979) . And this remained the case despite
attempts by the writer to discover any program descriptions
or behavior modification approaches that would avoid these
criticisms
.
It is the contention of the writer that because of
the huge number of cases in point, drawing conclusions
about the educational application of behavior modification
techniques is valid and worth stating while being mindful
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of the above mentioned caveat— i.e., that some of these
criticisms do not necessarily follow from Skinnerian
principles
.
The application of Skinnerian principles to
educational settings for disturbed children proceeds
exactly as it would in other settings. Emitted behavior
of the organism is seen as acting upon the environment,
with consequences ensuing, giving feedback to the organism.
In the case of deviant behavior, Skinner maintains that
there is some kind of positive feedback engaging the
children, increasing the probability that such behavior
will recur.
Those in his immediate environment may not be aware
that they have participated in reinforcing the child's
maladaptive behavior, but the reinforcing elements must
be identified and the environmental system of rewards and
punishments altered in ways specifically designed to alter
the behavior. Sequentially, the modification process
proceeds as follows: First, the maladaptive behavior is
explicitly identified, described and its frequency measured
and recorded. According to Haring and Phillips (1974) , in
order to qualify as an appropriate behavior for modifying,
the behavior should be couched in observable terms,
have
a definite beginning and end, and be repeatable.
baseline for the occurrence of that behaviorNext
,
a
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is determined, derived from current frequency of occurrence.
This is followed by a careful analysis of the reinforcers
in the environment and their relevance to the behavior in
question. Often with disturbed children the reinforcers
considered are based on Premack's (1965) notion of
determining a high probability behavior that is naturally
occurring, e.g., enjoying recess, and using that to
encourage a low probability, but desired behavior, e.g.,
staying in their seats during work time.
Teachers must be astute in their observations of any
approximation of the desired target behavior. This is
particularly true with disturbed children whose behaviors
may only slightly and infrequently approach the desired
behavior. These approximations must be noticed and rein-
forced, according to the plan constructed, with the inten-
tion of gradually shaping the behavior toward less
disruptive, undesirable or maladaptive behavior. For
disturbed children the process may be very gradual indeed
and much patience and attentiveness is required from the
teacher
.
According to Skinner, "behavior, even when it is
highly complex, may be shaped in any direction one wishes
by differential reinforcement of successive
approximations
to the desired operant" (Langer, 1969, p. 62).
This paradigm ignores the power or relevance of
causal factors in deviance, and deals only with the
behavioral manifestations—which are not viewed as the
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signifiers of the problems, but as the problems themselves.
Behaviorists pursue a course designed to discover
the modifying environmental conditions, analyze relation-
ships between environment and observable behavior and
account for the changes in those behaviors.
This technology does not require any acquaintance
with esoteric theories or understanding of the symbolic
meaning of behavior or knowledge of psychopathology.
Instead it places the emphasis firmly upon the individual
maladaptive behavior as a function of circumstances in the
environment. It is a course of action intended to be
applicable to both individuals and groups; to be appropriate
for affective, psychosocial and cognitive aspects of func-
tioning; to be easily utilized by personnel with only a
moderate amount of training; and to be applicable in a
variety of settings.
Critiques of Behavior Modification
This approach, while it has been highly influential
and pervasively practiced, is the subject of critical
assessments from a variety of sources, directed at
a
number of its specific policies and procedures.
Some of
these will be examined in the following section,
both in
their general application and with particular
reference to
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the education of emotionally disturbed children. There is
no question
,
even by its staunchest critics, that the
behavior modification paradigm has been extremely useful
in the education of disturbed children. It is the conten-
tion of this study, however, that the approach is limited
in scope, inadequate in promoting more complex thinking,
and unable to develop self-determined learning or signifi-
cant transfer of learning.
Related to Motivation . The behaviorist position with
regard to motivation is that it is not a useful or meaning-
ful concept. In its place is a highly complex system of
reinforcement designed to explain the shaping of behavior
from external reward and punishment, or, phrased in another
way, from the consequences arising in the environment as
a result of that behavior.
This rejection of motivational aspects of human
behavior has prompted much criticism.
The most persistent complaint against behaviorism
is that it fails to recognize the rational and
intentional element of human behavior [and]
neglects what some consider to be the most
important psychological determinant of all;
that is motivation (Robinson, 1976, p. 400).
In his attempt to excise the concept of intrinsic
motivation from his technique, Skinner is left with a
resulting inability to account for data that appears to
be extremely relevant in deciphering and understanding a
given behavior. Other critics have voiced the same
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objection: the behaviorist view of motivation is limited
in scope and inadequate to the task of accounting for all
human behavior (MacMillan and Forness, 1970a).
Examples of stimulation seeking behavior are not
neatly, if at all, explained in the behavior modification
approach. Festinger (1957)
,
for example, stipulates that
when incoming stimulation differs from existing perceptions
or conceptions, motivation to resolve the discrepancy
follows. This is certainly an intrinsic form of motivation,
not accounted for in the behaviorist technique and, accord-
ing to Festinger, this cognitive incongruity quite commonly
acts as a primary motivational source.
Behavior theory cannot adequately account for
children's seeking mastery without any observable or extrin-
sic reinforcement present. This includes such behavior as
a baby's attempts at self-feeding when being fed would
surely produce greater immediate reward. White (1965)
views this as a significant consideration, one which
behavior modification technique cannot encompass. As a
result, that paradigm is weakened in its attempt to view
motivation as simply extrinsic and observable when signi-
ficant exceptions occur.
One is unable to observe the consequences for
behaviors that result from exploration, cogni-
tive dissonance, curiosity, and competence as
motives. Yet, these sources of motivation must
not be ignored or discounted as one attempts to
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reach the atypical child (MacMillan and Forness,
1970a)
.
In fact, disturbed children who tend toward inordinate
dependence on authority, have an even greater need than
normal children to develop more independent, intrinsic
motivations in striving for competence.
The behaviorist ' s rejoinder to this criticism is
couched in asking what is added to the publicly observable
connection between response and reinforcer when the notion
of motivation is supplied? The answer is formulated in
terms of all the exceptions that exist and of all the data
for which a behaviorist account does not suffice.
An interesting issue raised by MacMillan and Forness
(1970a) is whether the behaviorist emphasis on extrinsic
motivation in the form of rewards from the environment
impedes the internalized self-rewarding or self-correcting
response found to be operative in effective problem-solvers.
This self-induced response has been described by Jensen
(1968) as most often covert, especially in adults, and
consists of implicitly saying "that's right" or "that's
wrong" in a self-corrective mode. This feature of effective
problem-solving behavior is not the same, the author points
out, as external versions, nor do other unrelated rein-
forcers typically applied in behaviorist settings function
in the same way. The question MacMillan and Forness
raise,
then, is do behaviorists deprive a child of developing
this
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internal monitoring device and hinder his problem-solving
ability in their use of extrinsic motivation?
The behaviorists ' defense against this criticism
directed at extrinsic motivation is articulated in the
notion of fading out the external rewards gradually so
that behavior is then presumed to occur without benefit of
such externality. "But the child often doesn't make this
shift to independent learning" (Forman and Kuschner, 1977).
The point is made also by other researchers in critical
appraisal of this crucial aspect of the behavior modifica-
tion paradigm (Reid, 1978a, 1978b, 1979; Schmid-Kitsikis
,
1973, 1976) .
Of the many studies advocating extrinsic reinforcement
(e.g., Broden, Hall, Dunlap and Clark, 1970; O'Leary and
Becker, 1967)
,
None appears to have demonstrated control of
behavior by a) an extrinsic reinforcement system,
b) fading the extrinsic system while employing
a self-management program based on an intrinsic
reinforcement system, and c) maintaining the
self-managed behavior over time and across
settings. Moreover, programs which are designed
to change behavior without a provision for
permanent maintenance are of little use and may
in fact be ethically suspect (Wehman, Abramson
and Norman, 1977) .
This raises the related issue of arbitrary vs.
natural reinforcers and the general problem of distinguish-
ing between reinforcement for acquisition and for mainten-
ance of a given behavior. Much of the reinforcement used
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in educational settings is of the arbitrary kind (Ferster,
1966; Chadwick and Day, 1971; Haring and Phillips, 1972).
Teachers are encouraged to set up such reinforcers, e.g.,
check-marks, tokens, food, etc. Ferster (1966) points out
that performances so reinforced are narrowly specified and
do not tend to lead to integrated general learning. The
fact that there is no functional connection between the
arbitrary reinforcer and the target behavior is important
here. Furthermore, "it should be noted that while behavior
is acquired and strengthened under frequent reinforcement,
it is also more easily extinguished whenever the rein-
forcement is removed or greatly reduced" (Wehman, Abramson
and Norman, 1977) . It is, therefore, questionable whether
behavior modifiers are actually making this transition to
naturally occurring reinforcers.
Scriven (1973, p. 425), too, addresses the issue of
performance maintenance in his criticism of the behaviorist
approach: "Behavior modification in general has not gone
after maintaining performance without external reinforcers.
Since such maintenance is at least part of what is usually
meant by learning, its absence in the applied programs
based on this approach is a significant failing.
This is admittedly a problem of application since
teachers can develop greater emphasis on natural
reinforcers
if they select and plan well. Yet this is
often not the
case. MacMillan and Forness (1970a) suggest the
pervasiveness of this practice and express concern over
its occurrence:
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Teachers employing the behavior modification
strategy, as they interpret it, have had their
children on check marks for an entire year.
When asked the reason the children were still
functioning at this low level, the teacher
indicated, 'I'm not about to change something
that is working 1' This teacher has failed in
her responsibility to bring the child's
behavior under the control of reinforcers
that will exist in the child's natural
environment
.
Wehman, Abramson and Norman (1979, p. 229), in an
extensive review of the behaviorist literature on external
reinforcement issues, suggest that problems exist in
changing to natural reinforcers.
Fading reinforcement contingencies will not be
sufficent to maintain newly developed behavior
patterns unless the responses come under control
of other powerful reinforcers which correspond
to natural environmental conditions. Perhaps
behavioral programmers must revise their
approach to program development.
Because the child often does not make the shift to
independent learning from being extrinsically motivated as
it is described in the behavior modification paradigm, it
would seem more advisable to use an educational procedure
that seldom uses external reinforcement and thereby obviate
the problem of having to fade the reinforcement out
(Forman and Kushner, 1977, p. 105)
.
Another problematic element of this external.
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typically positive reinforcement is that it is possibly
received by disturbed children as the other side of a
judgmental coin. The recipient of such positive reward
may become anxious, realizing that although he received
praise or reward this time, an inordinate pressure may be
experienced to keep up the good work or face feelings of
unworthiness. For these children, then, positive rein-
forcement holds within it an attenuated negative criticism.
Related to Complex Thought . The behavior modification
approach maintains that learning is essentailly learning
when to do what with prescriptions for how to accomplish
tasks designed in small incremental steps. Yet "the usual
learning situation is much more complex than is suggested
by the behaviorist paradigm . . . The analysis of human
learning in terms of discrete operational steps may ignore
or violate the inherent logic in the material to be learned"
(MacMillan and Forness, 1970a, p. 293)
.
According to many critics, this approach also violates
the complexity of the learner and of the interactive
elements that are in a more dynamic relationship to each
other than the behaviorists would acknowledge (Forman and
Kuschner, 1977; Furth and Wachs, 1975; Inhelder, 1976;
Mann and Phillips, 1971).
Reid (1978) reports that the findings of studies
refute the assumption thatwithin special education
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disturbed children learn best through the behavior modifi-
cation orientation which specifies learning through
associations typically fostered by repeated exercise and
drill.
This prevalent practice of focusing on the more
limited, perceptual aspects of thought (Blatt and Garfunkel,
1973) does not do justice to the more complex functions
such as generalizing, predicting, analyzing, evaluating and
inferring. The behavior modification paradigm ignores the
interplay between empirical observation or absorption of
perceptual data and the process of reflexive abstraction
in which the perceptual information is used in a more
generalized fashion leading to logical thinking abilitites.
Criticism is directed also at the incremental units
into which a behaviorist curriculum is organized (Forman
and Kuschner, 1977; Reid, 1978b; Schmid-Kitsikis , 1976).
It is suggested that except in the most simplistic learning
situations, the children themselves should discover how to
break down a task into small steps. Instead of fractional-
izing the curricular task (Mann and Phillips, 1967) into
isolated components, a more successful approach would be
to develop an easier whole task, one which elicits the
highest level of thought process the child can manage
and
one which has an entire contextual meaning appropriate
to
his level of understanding.
The fragmented aspects of the disturbed child's
intellectual apparatus requires not the fractionalized
97
approach (Mann and Phillips, 1967) current in educational
programs designed for him, but the presentation of learning
tasks which emphasize the relation between dimensions.
It is difficult at best for this behaviorist approach
to foster the more complex aspects of thought while often
emphasizing immediate reinforcement, empirical observation,
simple perceptions of events, and incremental steps in
learning. In fact it is criticized for its emphasis of
the perceptual by those who view perception itself to be
guided by the structures of thought already formed.
According to Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith (1976) , what
children actually observe in the empirical world is guided
by their theories of what they should be seeing.
This strategy also fails to encourage the kind of
frustration tolerance that makes reflective thought
attractive (Carpenter, 1974) : Given the practical inter-
pretation of Skinnerian principles occurring within most
classes for disturbed children, it appears unlikely that
those precepts which theoretically could be employed to
reinforce more reflective thinking are forthcoming.
Instead, the classroom milieu for these children is not
seen to be hospitable to reflective thought processes
(Reid, 1978b, Voyat , 1978; Schmid-Kitsikis , 1976).
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Related to Problem-solving and Invention.
The ability to reason, think abstractly and
solve complex problems cannot develop as long
as the child functions preoperationally—that
is, as long as the child's thoughts are
dominated by perceived events in the immediate
present (Wyne and O'Conner, 1979, p. 119).
Abstract thinking and creative problem-solving, then,
require experience with conceptual thinking and the inte-
gration or synthesis of concepts. These complex forms of
thought are fostered through the experience and practice
of viewing objects, events and ideas in terms of relational
aspects or causal connections. Inventive thought also
requires such practice in applying the integrative elements
between objects, events or ideas. The behaviorist approach
neither explains these adequately nor encourages their
occurrence in the classroom.
Successful invention usually expands freedom of
action or range of influence and it is pursued
even when it is not clear just what advantages
will ensue. Invention often leads to new
problems, some of which can be clearly predicted
during the inventive process. But it is often
rewarding even though it may create more
problems and aversive conditions than it solves
or alleviates (Carpenter, 1974, p. 138).
Behaviorist-oriented pedagogy does not by definition
or of necessity eliminate mediational or problem-solving
strategies to enhance the effectiveness of learning, but
in its practical applications does not seem to focus on
this aspect. Moreover, its reinforcement policies lend
themselves to fostering small incremental changes,
primarily in given perceptual tasks or rote learning even
though this too is not necessarily so as derived from
Skinnerian principles.
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This criticism hinges on distinguishing between two
kinds of experience. Behaviorists assume there is only
physical experience in which information is drawn from the
objects themselves. The more abstract form of thought
referred to above is based on a form of logical thought,
drawn not simply from the object itself but from the child's
actions and the coordination of those actions, i.e., the
operations and transformations brought to bear on those
objects.
If the primary emphasis in a behaviorist approach is
on physical experience, the child does not have sufficient
opportunity for developing this ability to abstract or
utilize logical forms of thought. Such programs fail, then,
to provide significant experiences which might promote an
awareness on the part of disturbed children of complex
relations and abstractions (Forman and Hill, 1980).
Related to Transfer of Learning . As viewed by
critics, part of the problem of learning transfer is
embedded in the definition of learning and the criteria
used to measure it. The critics consider inadequate
the
behaviorist objective of teaching the child new information
while not fostering the skills requiredin each instance
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to acquire new information himself or to restructure the
information in a personally significant framework. The
notion of learning, then, is too narrow, the criteria
too specific in the behaviorist approach. "The behaviorist
typically does not focus on information processing but,
instead, on the overt behavior, the performance" (Forman
and Kuschner, 1977, p. 99). Thus there is a failure to
see that learning involves discovering what information
is necessary and then applying it to the problem.
The behavioristic approach has the disadvantage of
a high rate of false positives--that is, assuming that
learning has occurred, when in fact it has not (Kamii and
Derman, 1971; Forman and Kuschner, 1977). Kamii and
Derman demonstrated the superficial effects of Englemann's
behavior modification approach. Engleman attempted to
teach a particular task and according to his standards
and his post-test, he was satisfied that the children had
learned the task. Kamii and Derman then administered a
post-test requiring the transfer of that very same material
to another similar situation, a task which the children
totally failed to accomplish. It would appear that what
was accepted by this behavior modifier as learning qualified
more as an evidence of rote performance. The children had
not learned in any meaningful sense of that term.
Critics of the behaviorist approach admit that it is
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often important to look for the occurrence of some
specified behavioral criterion in determining if learning
has occurred (Forman and Kuschner, 1977). However, this
may be a necessary condition but not always sufficient.
Nor can the occurrence of the behavioral criterion auto-
matically signal that learning has occurred. If the
learning criterion is too product-oriented and based only
on a single instance, learning may only appear to have
occurred. If the learning does not obtain in a situation
of transfer, then it is not a meaningful statement to
call it learning.
Related to Transmission of Knowledge Model and
Passivity . In a behaviorist orientation, the emphasis in
learning is on the human capacity to transmit information.
Kamii and DeVries (1977) have shown that the construction
of the typical objectives in behaviorist-oriented special
education programs is based on the notion that knowledge
is transmitted from the environment, usually through the
teacher. Their research has demonstrated that such
transmission is not a sufficient condition for learning.
Acquisition of knowledge depends on a more complex inte
gration of factors than the behaviorist pedagogy allows.
Part of the problem raised regarding the transmission-
of-knowledge model is concommitant passivity on the part
Reid (1978) speculates that the resistanceof the learner.
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demonstrated by disturbed children to thinking about their
activity, i.e., the reflexive aspects of abstraction, is
at least partially related to the emphasis on perceptual
stimuli and the passive absorption of information so
rampant in the educational programs designed for these
children.
Emotionally disturbed children already exhibit strong
tendencies to avoid the connections between action and
states (Reid, 1978) . Emphasis on learner passivity within
the classroom environment further exacerbates their
problem. It has been suggested that it becomes increasingly
difficult for children to participate actively in their own
learning experience when the curricular emphasis is on
perceptual stimuli and passive absorption of information
from teachers and texts (Piaget, 1974)
.
Because disturbed children are often enslaved by
patterns of action they are currently unable to change,
it is especially problematic that behavior modification
programs do not often provide experience with developing
new perspectives, generating alternatives or recognizing
relationships and transformations between objects and
events. If these experiences were provided, they would
have the effect of expanding the children's view to include
the development of more transformational, change-oriented
thought processes, and as a result help them focus
less on
103
only the static elements in situations that they are
involved in socially, emotionally or academically.
Related to the Teaching Process . For Skinner, the
educational process, and the teaching process in particular,
is simply the technique of arranging the contingencies of
reinforcement under which children learn. Teachers must
set up consequences, occurring in the school environment,
that follow from the child's action, emphasizing positive
reinforcement.
Behaviorist-oriented pedagogy supports a closely-
structured, teacher-centered learning environment in which
control is an important element. The teacher is the
primary controlling agent, functioning in that capacity
through his selection of information to be learned and
construction of appropriate situations to accomplish stated
goals via manageable incremental steps and reinforcing of
behaviors that approximate the desired learning.
Since learning may be defined in terms of
responses to discriminative stimuli under
conditions of reinforcement and since
teachers are charged with the task of
arranging these so as to promote learning
(Skinner, 1968), it follows that in a very
real sense learning is held to be contingent
upon teacher behavior (Wedell, 1975, p. 73).
Behavior analysis fails to provide an adequate basis
or framework from which to select educational goals
(MacMillan and Forness, 1970). The methodology which is
so powerful in terms of changing maladaptive
behavior to
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more acceptable behavior is not matched by concern for how
broad educational goals are determined. "Teachers are
provided with an efficient means of taking emotionally
disturbed children someplace but are not substantially
aided in the selection of where to go" (Hewett et al.,
196 9, p. 525) .
Lacking a developmental framework, as would be
provided in other systems, e.g.
,
Piagetian or Deweyan, the
teacher is left with a certain gap which is filled on the
basis of arbitrary decisions. Grass and Kreger (1978)
criticize the wide-scale use of performance objectives
which provide a generalized list of sequential goals
without being limited to any specific developmental hier-
archies and without offering any guidelines for methodo-
logical intervention.
Wood (1968) and MacMillan and Forness (1970a) express
concern that teachers may be provided only with the
powerful technical tools of behavior modification and not
equipped at the same time to understand its implications
and potential misuse. These techniques have the marked
disadvantage, as do many such tools, of being morally
blind. It is relatively easy to learn the applications
of the technique, but there is usually no concommitant
training of teachers in the ramifications of its possible
abuse
.
Conclus ion
Behavior modification, according to MacMillan and
Forness (1970a)
gives no direction in determining educational
goals; it reduces constructs of learning,
motivation and reinforcement to simplistic
terms on occasion. To the unsophisticated
practitioner, it may be blinding to broader
frames of reference . . . and may preclude
children from learning how to learn and thus
becoming independent of teachers as such—
a
major goal of education (p. 296)
.
Critics warn against the confusion of an appropriate
use of behavior modification techniques as an expedient
to make certain aspects of education and classroom organi-
zation possible for disturbed children, with the inappro-
priate use of the approach as a means for constructing
knowledge (MacMillan and Forness, 1970a; Forman and
Kuschner, 1977). Education, according to this critique,
is more than a change in behavior, but particularly with
disturbed children, it is an increase in consciousness of
self and in awareness of the transformations regulated and
coordinated by the learner. Behavior modification is not
ideally suited to or designed for eliciting awareness of
actions performed— an awareness that is crucial for
disturbed children both in organizing their meager sense
of self- as-actor and in discovering the transformations
that can be made on objects and ideas in order to avoid
their predominantly static modes of learning.
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This approach, with its system of external reinforce-
ments, tends to promote the learning of specific facts in
piecemeal fashion. Given the fragmented quality of a
disturbed child's learning profile, this fractionalized
curriculum with separate isolated pieces of information
fosters neither the development of a more organized network
of knowledge nor the developmental processes necessary in
acquiring and constructing knowledge more independently.
"Behavior modification may be an effective means to
produce or eliminate certain [maladaptive] behaviors that
prevent the child from interacting with the materials"
(Forman and Kuschner, 1977, p. 118). However, once a
child is focused on the materials, this approach is
inadequate to encourage the necessary exploration, self-
invoked questioning, determining of relevant problems and
searching for appropriate information that is required for
disturbed children to improve their social, emotional and
cognitive skills.
It should be clear from the general appraisals of
this approach that much of value can be derived from the
behaviorist paradigm. Its critics would agree with
MacMillan and Forness (1970a) that this "strategy has
tremendous potential for work with atypical children; but
although its use with these children is promising, its
misuse could be terrifying."
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Four Selected Areas
Four areas have been singled out for specific
consideration in this study: a) emotional conflict,
b) problems with social, emotional and cognitive autonomy,
3) the role of error, and 4) the role of active inquiry.
The first two have their origins in the problematic and
pathological development of disturbed children, while the
latter two originate within the educational setting in
which the children function. They are selected for closer
examination because they indicate together the interactive
and reciprocal impact between the nature of these children
and their environment. The problems experienced with
conflict and autonomy result in pedagogical problems for
the children and the roles of error and active inquiry are
likely to affect their social and emotional as well as
cognitive development.
Furthermore, these areas were selected because they
focus on aspects of emotional and educational growth that
have long-term impact on development, as opposed to the
short-term, specific aspects usually considered by the
behaviorist approach; and because these areas are inade-
quately addressed by this approach.
Emotional Conflict . Emotional conflict appears to
be a common element in disturbed children regardless
of
the variations in specific problems. Its genesis
may
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proceed from a variety of emotional, psychological,
physiological, social and environmental factors beyond the
scope of educators to assess. Yet its existence within
these children is a pervasive and powerful force to
consider in educational planning.
In more normally functioning children, conflict can
be evoked through occasional specific events and anxiety
may well result. This is part of a healthy, well-function-
ing human response system. Yet emotionally disturbed
children demonstrate a quick and continuous response to
situations that would ordinarily seem uneventful and not
apparently appropriate causes for conflict. It is the
chronic nature of the phenomenon that renders it so
powerful; its pervasiveness in these children affects
virtually every experienced event.
This chronic conflict can be viewed as a character-
istic readiness to react with emotional charge in response
to real or imagined dilemmas. It is manifested in a
variety of ways in classroom behavior; sudden outbursts of
rage, anxiety attacks over small decisions, agitated move-
ment and verbal responses, inability to utilize sufficient
self-calming tactics, intense hyperactivity or sullen,
passive withdrawal.
Existing behaviorist-oriented programs tend to treat
the conflict superficially and symptomatically, utilizing
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strategies that attempt to eradicate the behavioral
manifestation. This teaching strategy does not allow, much
less encourage, the child to deal actively with his own
conflict; it does not foster the construction of a reper-
toire of his own tools with which to "tame" the anxiety
and panic resulting from this conflict.
An analogy here might be helpful. In the case of
beginning instrumental string-players, correct intonation
is a most fundamental problem and is very difficult to
attain. The aural dissonance usually present can be viewed
as analogous to inner conflict. One educational strategy
is based on constant, external correction: "That's too
sharp. That's flat. Your hand is too high on the finger-
board." This approach attempts to eradicate the dissonance
directly from without by changing the existing behavior.
A contrasting approach is to have the student learn to hear
the dissonance, to become in-tune with his own out-of-
tuness" and through this to begin to change his intonation
accordingly because of his own internal dissatisfaction.
He then begins to develop a repertoire of his own tools
to help attain this goal. Educationally, this would trans-
late into programmatic planning that would provide experi-
ence in handling cognitive dissonance— a different kind
of
conflict that is external and manageable.
A significant problem resulting from the first
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approach is the lack of transference. The student learns
only a mechanical piece of data, e.g., "If I keep my hand
lower, I won't play too sharp." Whereas, the contrasting
approach leads to an internalized system of discrimination
that can then be applied to other areas of music to deepen
the understanding and broaden the scope of knowledge.
Current programs of the behaviorist mold tend to
ignore the connection of the child's inner conflict with
the educationally productive use of cognitive conflict.
Simply providing an environment of reduced conflict will
not modify the way in which the child experiences and
interacts with the world. In fact, his view of his own
turmoil may be intensified in this way. It is an age-old
solution to temper with an opposite, whereas here the
metaphor of innoculation might be more appropriate.
In failing to introduce manageable cognitive disso-
nance, current programs fail also to promote coping
strategies so vital to the educational growth of disturbed
children.
Intellectual, Social and Emotional Autonomy . The
initial development of autonomy begins with the onset of
some level of abstraction, i.e., the acquisition of a
mental representation of "other" in the infant's develop-
ment and a growing awareness in time of the separateness
of self. This is closely connected with the development
Ill
of object permanence in both its forms--with reference to
the permanence of material objects. This developing skill
evolves into the ability to retain a mental picture or
image of the object when it is no longer in view. It is
also referred to as object constancy and is used with
reference to both people and material objects.
This process is somehow short-circuited in most
disturbed children. As a result, first there is a loss in
object-constancy of meaningful others in their lives, and
following that a possible delay in developing object
permanence of material objects. This developmental delay
causes problems for disturbed children in their sense of
their growing separateness as individuals, and concommit-
antly with their growing conceptual frameworks. This
connection between intellectual and emotional autonomy has
been documented by Feffer, Feffer and Gouravitch, and
Feffer and Suchotliff (in Overton and Gallagher, 1977).
Related to this is the child's ability to recognize
and empathize with others, to acknowledge their perspective,
to accept his own boundaries as well as the boundaries of
others. Emotionally disturbed children tend to experience
a great deal of difficulty with the socio-emotional aspect
of this developmental task and a connected difficulty with
its cognitive counterpart which is seeing issues, events
and models from other perspectives.
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Xt is necessary for an educational setting to provide
an active role for the disturbed child in learning his own
parameters and to encourage respect for the perspectives
and boundaries of others in order to foster the emotional
and cognitive growth toward a healthier functioning.
Current behaviorist programs do not acknowledge the
importance of this task, nor do they provide appropriate
experiences for its development nor establish the connec-
tion between its socio-emotional and its cognitive aspects.
These programs, by virtue of their teacher-centered
emphasis (Safford, 1978; Reid, 1978a; Schmid-Kitsikis
,
1976) and their characteristic external reinforcement, fail
to provide adequate opportunities for developing an appre-
ciation of another's perspective in relation to the child's
own. Qualitative changes do not occur in acknowledging
another's perspective from having particular responses
reinforced, but rather from placing into juxtaposition his
own responses and those of other children as well as
authority figures (Forman and Kuschner, 1977; Furth, 1969)
.
Having the "correct" social rules or perspectives
presented externally and typically via the teachers'
authority does not encourage the kind of equilibration
required to develop social autonomy or awareness of self
and respect for others.
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Role of Error . The way in which an educational model
addresses error is crucial in determining the efficacy of
its program. "The effectiveness of any teaching program
critically hinges on the management of the wrong response"
(Blank
,
1973)
.
It has been the prevalent viewpoint among special
educators, particularly those teaching disturbed children,
that one great advantage of a behavior modification
approach is its organization of curriculum sequences into
simple, discrete increments which are intended to eliminate
the opportunity for error (Harshman, 1969; O'Leary and
O'Leary, 1972; Honig and Staddon, 1977).
Yet productive use can be made of error in at least
three ways. It has significant potential for purposes of
diagnosis, for aiding affective growth, and for stimulating
cognitive development.
1. Diagnostic Use of Error. Because behaviorist
programs minimize the occurence of error in their attempt
to organize instructional programs sequentially in small
incremental elements, the teacher has little opportunity
to gain insight into a pupil's pattern of inquiry through
a diagnosis of the kinds of mistakes that particular child
makes. It is especially important to develop such insight
in teaching disturbed children since their patterns of
ften erratic and quite different fromfunctioning are o
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those of normal children, and their educational profiles
tend to be irregular. The pedagogical thrust of behaviorism
restricts the diagnostic use of error as a critical source
of such insights.
This is not to say that in cases where the material
is simple that errors should automatically be introduced
or encouraged, but rather that many areas of the curriculum
should contain broader, more complex tasks that do not lend
themselves to successive approximations or small incremental
steps
.
More broadly conceived tasks of problem-solving allow
a teacher to gain insight into a child's intellectual
processes and strategies, and to plan more appropriate
activities each day. The errors and mis-strategies that
normally occur can be used as important diagnostic informa-
tion to indicate how the child structures his picture of
the world, the ways in which he would transfer this know-
ledge and the cognitive methods he brings to bear on the
data
.
2. Error and Affective Growth. In traditional
systems, error was simply wrong; it was punished or extin-
guished, and in the process it was often the source of a
child's shame and regret. In attempts to avoid this
educationally unproductive use of error, behaviorist
programs for disturbed children do tend to avoid these
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aversive controls, but they employ equally narrow
techniques. They exchanged aversive controls and punish-
ment for positive reinforcement, but retained the narrow
intellectual approach, adding smaller incremental steps
in each process, leaving intact the externality of the
reinforcement
.
Trying and failing in school—or anywhere—has a
profound impact on a child's view of himself. In order to
build self-esteem in this area a program that simply avoids
error misses significant opportunities for producing growth
in disturbed children; it must instead develop strategies
for comfortable risk-taking which may well lead to error.
Because of the often bizarre affective response that
disturbed children may have to the experience of error, it
is understandable that a behaviorist approach attempts to
alleviate this reaction by minimizing the occurrence of
error. The notion is that this gives the child a chance
to experience successful participation and receive positive
reinforcement in the classroom. While this is true, there
is another side of the issue to be considered. Learning
to accept the affective consequences of risk-taking
behavior, and hence error, is a slow but vital process in
the emotional growth of a disturbed child. The behaviorist
approach, in reducing the occasion of error for short-term
needs, does not deal with this critical longer-term need.
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The issue of self-esteem is important in a behaviorist
system. Yet the building of confidence tends to be founded
on small successes and the avoidance of error. This does
not encourage more broadly conceived intellectual tasks
such as hypothesizing
,
making judgments, predictions and
estimates, posing and solving problems, taking a critical
view or imagining another's perspective— all of which might
lead to error. To provide a safe environment for these
tasks, to foster the gaining of satisfaction through such
risk-taking, to feel comfortable with error and its rami-
fications are important elements in a program for disturbed
children.
3. Error and Cognitive Development. If error is
considered pernicious, or even simply unproductive, this
certainly places a premium on success and correct responses.
Current programs do not emphasize error: a) as interesting,
provocative, and rich in possibility for insight into the
child's own structuring of knowledge; b) as an interesting
response which really answers another equally valuable
question to be pursued at some other point; or c) as a
mistaken departure which suddenly seems to signal a new and
productive approach, or imparts insight into a new problem.
They instead tend to sacrifice the richness of outcome to
the safety of small, correct answers which do not generate
anxiety
.
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Behaviorist programs, then, do not allow for, let
alone encourage, the productive use of error for cognitive
development. Even allowing error to occur is counter to
behaviorist procedure. Consequently, disturbed children
are not given a chance to see their errors as potentially
fruitful, leading to a new direction, or giving a sudden
new insight. This aspect of their education is important
for these children for whom error and failure often signal
the end rather than the beginning of a cognitive learning
sequence
.
In a behaviorist-oriented approach error, therefore,
is clearly programmed out whenever possible (Harshman, 1969;
Hewett
,
1968; Honig and Stadlon, 1977; O'Leary and O'Leary,
1972) . Yet the confrontation of error has certain implicit
value which is by-passed in such programs. For instance,
coming to terms with a wrong response often solidifies a
right response, leads to the gradual internalization of the
"rules" that are applicable and affords the child evaluative
techniques which can be used independently of the teacher
(Blank, 1973, pp. 88-89).
If not given the opportunity to coordinate his own
incorrect view with another viewpoint, but instead experi-
ences no chance for error or has an error immediately
corrected by teacher or text, the child does not
become
practiced in the process of viewing his own mistakes
in a
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meaningful context. Kamii (1981) sees this process of the
child's examining his own error in the context of its
contradictions or inadequacies as crucial for both the
narrow goals of remembering the correct answer as well as
the broader goal of coming to trust his own thought
processes. Children whose errors are handled in the
behaviorist manner, Kamii maintains, will come to distrust
their own thinking.
Another consequence of behaviorist "errorless
learning" is that the children fail to learn what to ask
on their own with respect to the problem and the materials
involved. Nor are they learning to develop or test their
own hypotheses. If one aspect of learning is "discovering
what information is relevant to a particular problem, then
learning to learn is learning to discover what information
is relevant to a particular problem" (Forman and Kuschner
,
1977
,
p. 110) .
Basically, behaviorists fail to recognize that errors
do not necessarily arise from the child's inaccurate
perception of empirical phenomena, but often from the
absence of an appropriate framework to incorporate or
organize the perceived information (Schmid-Kitsikis , 1978,
p. 359) . Therefore, the behaviorist approach to
error not
only does not allow for appropriate diagnostic material
to
be gained, and does not use error productively
with regard
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to affective and cognitive growth; it fails to understand
the significance and origin of error in certain contexts.
Role of Active Exploration and Inquiry . Programs
designed for disturbed children underestimate the power of
active exploration in cognitive development. "These
children are more likely to perform exercises and drills
rather than to explore their environment and to pursue
their own interests. Drill, programmed learning and M-
and-M's do not encourage reasoning. Exploration does"
(Reid, 1978, p. 227)
.
There is a behaviorist tendency to view knowledge
acquisition as the absorption and accumulation of infor-
mation from the external world rather than as a process
of construction. The attempt is made to impart information
to the child, a passive receptor. The learner is seen as
a receiver of predetermined products of a discipline rather
than as an investigator of the structure underlying a
discipline. Reid's observation further supports this
description; "These practices assume a passive learner,
a fixed body of knowledge and skills to be diagnosed and
remediated, and fixed approaches to learning problems"
(Reid, 1978, p. 227)
.
Active exploration is also important for emotionally
disturbed children as a contribution to the acquisition
or
strengthening of personal identity. In current programs
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children are not encouraged to formulate their own limits
and boundaries with respect to cognitive, social and
emotional parameters. Because of this passive role
assigned to the child in a behaviorist approach, he is not
often given the opportunity to set his own limits--
intellectually or socially. He therefore gets little
practice in constructing the borders of his identity.
Active decision-making is likely to aid in developing a
sturdier self-concept and particularly when those decisions
pertain to children's own limits. More of this would be
useful in a setting for disturbed children.
This absence of active exploration in behaviorist
programs is particularly reflected in the choice of curri-
culum materials. "The notion that special needs children
require stimulus- lean environments may have evolved as a
way of getting children to attend to highly evolved tasks
that are not developmentally appropriate" (Meisels, 1979,
p. 2 02) , and moreover are not absorbing or motivating.
Cruickshank et al. (1962) describe this reduced-stimuli
environment for disturbed children as follows:
Learning is conditioning; environmental stimuli
should be reduced, as should the physical space;
a structured school and life plan provided and
the stimulus value of the materials designed to
cope with the particular psychopathology and
teaching directly to the disability.
This view indicates the severe limitations on exploration
characteristic of behavior modification systems.
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It is this active involvement of the knower
transforming objects in his environment that is often
missing in behaviorist special education programs, and
which could function as a powerful motivating force for
disturbed children. This kind of interaction with the
materials in the child's environment--this changing,
preserving, reversing, rearranging, enhancing--is the
basis of cognitive growth as viewed by certain critics of
the behaviorist paradigm (Forman and Kuschner, 1977; Kamii,
1971; Furth and Wachs, 1975) . Its underemphasis in
current programs is seen by them as problematic.
CHAPTER V
CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
Before elaborating a constructivist pedagogical
alternative to behavior modification it is necessary to
examine the conceptual foundations of constructivism.
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to present a
brief outline of the main conceptual elements of construc-
tivism as developed by Piaget. This conceptual framework
will indicate the principal differences in orientation that
set this approach apart from that of Skinnerian behavior-
ists
,
and will also provide the conceptual bases for an
alternative pedagogy for emotionally disturbed children.
If behaviorism tends to be guided by a mechanistic,
unilinear metaphor that emphasizes the passive relationship
of the organism to an external environment, constructivism
is conceptually more biological and multidimensional,
bringing in dynamic interactions between a range of
physical, internal psychological and external social varia-
bles. Piaget's formulation can be viewed as a set of
orienting attitudes or concepts in which theoretical
elements have been drawn in large part from empirical
observations. In the Piagetian description of cognitive
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development important formulations are based on the
processes of adaptation and their relation to psychological
9^^iizat ion
,
with emphasis on the principle of active
construction and dynamic equilibration.
Piaget's epistemological perspective provides the
overarching framework for his formulation of constructivism,
and hence it is well to begin with this. The notion of
active construction is a basic guiding principle that
permeates other components of constructivist theory and
should be clarified next. Of the four factors--maturation
,
experience, social transmission and equilibration--which
in Piaget's view, most significantly influence cognitive
development, the fourth factor, equilibration, is the most
unique contribution and the one that is critical in
pulling the other three together. Since the overall
function of the equilibration process is seen as adaptation,
a description of this principle follows rather than precedes
the discussion of causal factors in cognitive development.
A summary of the Piagetian conception of the stages
of cognitive development is presented at the end of the
chapter. These stages, considered by Piaget to be invari-
ant, are perhaps the best known feature of his conceptual
framework. While they are often used as a point of depar-
ture by students and practitioners , it is contended here
that using this as the total reference point diminishes,
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if not distorts, the potential significance of the richness
of Piagetian thought. Consequently, prior attention is
given to the foundations of Piaget's conceptual framework
as a more productive point of reference than the stages
per se.
General Epistemological Perspective
Historically, classical epistemology was the province
of speculative philosophy, with little in the way of
empirical study to support any given position. Piaget
(1971) criticized the use of speculative methods with
respect to epistemological questions and advocated the
study of children's actual cognitive development to
determine the nature of knowledge and the process by which
it is acquired.
His self-appointed task, as an epistemologist , has
been to apply observational techniques to child behavior
and extract data from those observations on which to base
his theory. He describes his endeavor as genetic epistemo-
logy (Piaget, 1970, 1976).
This epistemological viewpoint incoporates elements
of both Humean empiricism and Kantian rationalism. Piaget
stresses experience but not human passivity in relation
to it. He also stresses human organization patterns in
thought as giving meaning to experience and even shaping
perception. From Piaget's perspective, the rationalists
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and the empiricists failed to see that each was emphasizing
only half of what is an integrated interactive process, a
cycle of dynamic and reciprocal influence.
Piaget rejects as separate alternatives both the
empiricist and the nativist approaches. He rejects the
nativist, preformed, innate categories of knowing into
which sensory stimulation is channeled, as well as the
empiricist consideration of the developing organism as
completely subject to environmental contingencies.
Development in the first instance is then merely innate
maturational activation; in the second instance knowledge
is but a subjective copy of the external world. Both are
untenable according to Piaget who instead views knowledge
as sets of dynamic relations (Furth, 1969; Forman, 1980)
.
Objections were raised by Piaget to the reductive
atomism found in both modern behaviorism as well as in
classical empiricism. These disciplines have attempted to
explain patterns of intelligent adult behavior in the same
terms as the infant or lower animals; higher, more complex
forms are then viewed simply as incremental additions of
homogeneous elements. Piaget's developmental view sharply
contrasts in its emphasis on different forms of organization
at different levels and on structures that are inexplicable
as mere additions of homogeneous elements (Mischel, 1979).
interactionist in that he emphasizesThe theory is
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the dynamic interrelationship of subject and object, of
knower and known. It is constructivist in that the process
of coming to know is viewed as an active construction
originating in internal structures and organizational
abilities from within the knower.
Principle of Active Construction
Piaget differs from Skinner in some very basic,
elemental ways, one of which is his assumption of an active
organism as opposed to Skinner's view of an essentially
passive organism. He sees this active element in the very
beginning of child development, with an infant who controls
in some sense the procuring and organizing of his own
outside experience. At first the activities that organize
patterns of resulting experiences are physical, directed
toward objects and events in the environment. The scope
of possibilities expands as the child grows and his range
of exploration continues to increase.
At a later point in this developmental process, these
external activities also develop an increasingly significant
inward dimension and include symbolic and more sophisticated
use of language to represent actions and operations on
objects and ideas. In fact, for Piaget, thought is essen-
tially interiorized action in an effort toward internal
organization and growth.
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Understanding the dynamic quality of trans-
formations ... is dependent on activity, at
first actual, then internalized and finally
reversible.
. . . The child must act on objects
and transform them in order to comprehend their
nature (Reid, 1978, p. 205).
Thought, then, may eventually proceed almost entirely
without direct reference to physical actions in the
environment, although its origins are deeply rooted in
such action. Instead, the older child or adolescent is
capable of representing mentally the physical world and
proceeding by means of memories, imagery, language and
symbols
.
While Skinner focuses exclusively on behavior, Piaget
views the same behavior as not merely a response to the
external stimulation of the environment. He also sees in
the reaction of the organism evidence of its underlying
structural aspects. From this biological perspective, the
stimulus is not viewed as fully formed, separate and
external to the organism and only acting upon it.
In the Piagetian position, all levels of behavior
indicate aspects of construction deriving at least
partially from the organism's intrinsic structure. This
structuring aspect is identical with meaningful, knowing
behavior. "To know is therefore an activity of the
subject and knowledge is a construction in the true sense
of the term" (Furth, 1969, p. 15).
Piaget rejects the demarcation between perception and
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abstraction, maintaining that even rudimentary perceptual
information is gained as a result of constructive activity
of the organism interacting with sensory data. Knowledge,
for Piaget, is never a state, whether subjective, repre-
sentative or objective; it is never static but always
dynamic. It is an activity. Knowledge can be viewed as
"a structuring of the environment according to underlying
subjective structures or as a structuring of the subject
in living interaction with the environment" (Furth, 1969,
p. 20)
.
Four Factors in Cognitive Development
Piaget's articulation of four factors responsible for
cognitive development is central to his theory. According-
ly, the following section presents a close, if condensed,
look at these factors as a composite drawn from primary and
secondary sources (Piaget, 1970; Gallagher and Reid, 1981;
Furth, 1969; Pulaski, 1980; Wyne and O'Connor, 1979). In
the Piagetian conception, then, cognitive development is
the result of the interaction of four essential factors:
(a) physiological maturation, (b) experience, (c) social
transmission, and (d) equilibration.
Maturation is seen as a necessary but insufficient
condition to explain cognitive growth. This is not a
maturational theory; development does not simply unfold.
So while Piaget acknowledges maturation as a factor, it
is
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not highly emphasized in his theory.
Experience is divided by Piaget into three major
areas: exercise, physical experience and logico-mathemati-
cal experience. The first refers to those actions which
do not lead to new knowledge. The second refers to the
manipulation of objects that leads to the discovery of
properties; it is the action of noticing the positive
characteristics of objects which Piaget calls affirmations.
He describes the process as one of empirical abstraction
,
indicating his belief that properties do not impose them-
selves on a passive mind, but rather the knower abstracts
them from the objects.
The third kind of experience is emphasized in Piaget's
theory and is rarely mentioned in other theories. It too
is gained from one's own activity with objects but indirect-
ly so, by reflecting on those activities, drawing out infer-
ences and relationships, developing logical rules that are
applicable to any objects. This process Piaget describes
as reflexive abstraction . Although it too is originally
bound up with knowledge drawn from acting on objects, it
is not dependent on the continuation of that activity upon
the objects themselves, but eventually becomes content-
free. Knowing that the sum of objects counted is inde-
pendent of their order, for example, is originally based
on counting and arranging a set of objects, but the logical
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rule drawn from that process gradually becomes independent
of those or any objects.
While physical knowledge is gained through affirma-
tion as described above, logico-mathematical knowledge is
gained through the construction of negations or the under-
standing of nonproperties of objects, e.g., a red ball is
not square and not blue. Thus, it is sufficient in physical
knowledge to affirm the positive aspects of objects as in
empirical abstraction? in reflexive abstraction it is
necessary also to exclude logically properties that do not
obtain.
These kinds of activity /knowledge relate also to
Piaget's notion of the figurative/operative distinction.
Figurative refers to the knowledge of states or configura-
tions of reality as gained through perception or imitation.
Operative refers to cognitive functions required to under-
stand transformations; operations are described as inter-
nalized mental actions.
Figurative knowledge depends on recognition of the
configuration of the stimulus, while operative knowledge
involves inference-making at some level. There is a general
progression toward the use of operative knowledge in a
child's development, de-emphasizing the earlier predominance
of the figurative aspects of knowing (Forman, 1980b)
.
The interrelationship of empirical and reflexive
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abstraction, of figurative and operative knowing is of
central importance in Piaget's view of cognitive develop-
ment. The common element is activity, which provides the
foundations for both perceptions and concepts. Knowledge,
then, for Piaget, unlike Skinner, is not a process of
copying reality, but is founded on the knower's actions
upon objects to transform them and the connected activity
of thinking about the outcome.
Social Transmission is the third factor in explaining
cognitive development. It is gained through social and
cultural interaction, through the development of social
relationships and through the use of language and communi-
cation between individuals. The impact of social inter-
action is strongly felt by children. There is a certain
intensive exchange of ideas in a group of children in
terms of what is noticed, what is selected for focus, and
especially in terms of recognizing other perspectives and
incorporating the disagreement or disequilibrium in some
way
.
The importance of social activity within this system
is clearly illustrated in the following statement: "Witho
interchange of thought and co-operation with others the
individual would never come to group his operations into
a coherent whole" (Piaget, 1967, p. 163). The
emphasis
here is on active social involvement just as it is with
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respect to active involvement with objects. A child's
passive presence in a group will not necessarily assist in
the coordinations of mental actions just as passive
recognition of objects will not yield any understanding
of relations between those objects or between the objects
and the observer.
This view of social interaction is a dynamic one,
implying active contribution to the working group and
active involvement in the shifts and balances that occur
within it. "Such a system of human relationships replicates
the properties of mental operations. It allows the child
to become, himself, an action within a co-ordinated system
of actions" (Richmond, 1970, p. 95).
Social interaction is one method that is especially
effective in promoting decentering— a relinquishing of
egocentrism. It reveals the perspectives of others and
suggests that the child's own view is not the only possible
choice. This typically leads children into conflict and
into justifying and clarifying their views. Such clari-
fication has both affective and cognitive components.
Affectively, it suggests agreeing on a group issue, without
socially inappropriate behavior and coming to terms with
opposing views and with the feelings of others. Cogni-
tively, it suggests making one's ideas clear and
persuasive
with rationality on one's side.in order to convince
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Equilibration is the fourth factor responsible for
cognitive development; it is a final one that pulls
together and coordinates the other three and renders them
effective in promoting development. In Piaget's view, none
of the other three alone or in combination can account for
cognitive growth. Equilibration is proposed as a dynamic,
ongoing and self-regulating process which "acts as a
motivating force between the increasing competence of the
child (maturation) and his growing range of interactions
with objects and people (physical and social experience)
"
(Pulaski, 1980, p. 192).
This factor of equilibration is thought by Piaget to
structure internally and organize the developing intelli-
gence, providing the self-regulation through adaptation to
external and internal changes. It is a unifying principle
invoked to explain the impelling force in cognitive growth.
Invoking it does not mean that Piaget reduces the importance
of the external experience. On the contrary, Piaget sees
environmental factors as the medium in which intelligence
functions and with which it interacts
.
Particularly through this concept of equilibration,
Piaget demonstrates the biological emphasis of his theory.
His view of intelligence is based on this dynamic notion
that brings order, lawfulness, purpose and structure into
behavior
.
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The term equilibration is used to refer to the process
of self-correction or self-regulation because it leads to
increasingly advanced states of equilibrium within the
cognitive system. Its purpose is to eliminate contra-
dictions and the conflict between expectation and outcome.
Central to the development of Piaget's genetic epistemology,
equilibration illustrates the reciprocal nature of the
relationship between knower and known. It functions to
reorganize on a higher level what is learned from co-
ordinating the knower' s own activity in the construction
of rules and principles.
Equilibration is the essence of adaptive
functioning which for Piaget is constant at
all levels of development, even though the
states of equilibrium characteristic of each
level or stage differ qualitatively from one
stage to the next (Pulaski, 1980, p. 14).
Principle of Adaptation
Adaptation is the overall aim of the equilibration
process. It is a central concept in Piagetian thought and
is the essence of the biological functioning of all species.
It is a dynamic force, cyclically moving between its
components—assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation
is the process by which experiences, ideas, sensations,
or
nourishment are taken in and incorporated into the organ-
ism's own activity. This process is continuously
balanced
by accommodation in which the organism is in an
outgoing
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mode, adjusting to the impact of the environment. In
Piaget's view, it is the dynamic interaction between these
two elements that makes possible both physical and cognitive
development
.
The assimilation-accommodation balance is seen as a
continuous fitting of old structures into new functions and
the concommitant changing of new structures to suit old
functions under changed conditions. The developmental
process, then, originates from what already exists,
demonstrating a continuity with the past. Simultaneously,
current structures change in response to new demands.
Adaptation is basically a concept, having its origins
in the discipline of biology from which Piaget extrapolated
it, and applied it to human development. His procedure has
been to describe structures functioning at each age level,
demonstrate the ways they adapt to one another and to
environmental demands , and how these structures simultane-
ously modify what the environment demands.
An important application of this biological frame of
reference can be seen in Piaget's use of schema. It is
of interest to consider this term in contrast to the
behaviorist "response.” Schema may be simple or highly
differentiated. In its simplest form it may be similar to
"response." However, it is usually more complicated than
"response," in that "the schema generally includes aII
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variety of acts in many different circumstances, not just
a response to a specific stimulus," and also is more
mobile, being amenable to application to a variety of
objects (Baldwin, 1967, p. 174).
"Schema" is used not only for overt actions,
classified within the sensorimotor stage, but also for more
complex cognitive functioning or interiorized action.
Piaget believes that the latter derive from the former via
a process of internalization. The visual image, for
example, evolves from the action of looking. Development
is partly explained in terms of the intricate evolution of
simple, primitive schemas into broader, more operational
systems
.
The dynamic force of development can be seen at work
in Piaget's notion of assimilative schemas. In a given
situation, certain aspects are assimilable but not
completely assimilated and therefore evoke a schema,
motivate its use until the situation has been mastered.
As a result, the schema becomes a usable tool, but the
activity having been mastered no longer is attractive or
motivating. Perhaps a novel feature of the situation will
capture the child's attention until some equilibrium is
reached again. In this fashion there is a broader range
of situations covered, and a greater array of organized
systematic schemas results (Baldwin, 1976, p. 177).
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The accommodation process accounts for the necessary
modifications in those assimilation schemas. Thus,
assimilation and accommodation are complementary and occur
simultaneously, balancing each other to insure adaptation.
Adaptation is closely connected to the organization of the
organism. In the process of organizing his activities, the
individual assimilates novel events and simultaneously
accommodates existing structures to meet new demands of the
environment. As a result of these tendencies toward
organization and adaptation, new structures are continually
in a process of construction in the interaction with the
environment
.
Stages of Cognitive Development
Genetic epistemology divides cognitive development
into four stages: (a) sensorimotor stage (1-1*5 years) in
which coordination of action is emphasized; (b) pre-
operational, or representational, stage (2-6 years) in
which internalization of actions begins; (c) concrete-
operational stage (6-11 years) in which reversible
operations and relations among objects are characteristic;
and (d) formal-operational stage (11 or 12-adult) in which
relations between relations are typical.
In the first stage, the child progresses from
limited reflex action through the rudimentary beginnings
of mental representation as demonstrated in the gaining
of
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object permanence. There is initially an egocentric lack
of differentiation between the infant and objects in the
environment. The gradually achieved ability to comprehend
the permanence of objects—both physical objects and
significant people— is the supreme achievement of this
stage
.
The object, according to Piaget, involves more than
the child's perception of it as occupying space in the
external environment and possessing specific describable
properties. In order to comprehend the object in even the
most rudimentary fashion, the child must come to know it
as separate from himself and as independently existing.
This task represents the first crucial step away from the
extreme egocentricity of infancy.
The preoperational , second stage is characterized
by symbol formation, beginnings of language comprehension,
and mental representation. The child at this stage is not
yet able to use these symbols to operate logically on the
environment, but he has gone beyond the sensorimotor stage
in knowing that some changes do not make a difference, why
they do not and how to express this knowledge in language.
This period reflects a time of increasing fluency with a
variety of symbols, which aid in going beyond the informa-
tion perceived in the immediate present.
Concommitant with the inability to operate logically
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is the continuation of some form of egocentric functioning,
namely the inability to see another's perspective—cogni-
tively and socially. The preoperational child truly
believes everyone views the world as he does, his own
perspective is assumed to be objectively true and absolute.
What exists for him in dreams or imagination exists equally
for anyone else. He infuses the world with animistic and
magical thinking, viewing his environment as alive and
purposeful as he himself is.
The preoperational child maintains a narrow, rigid
and egocentric perspective, unable to focus his attention
beyond the immediate configurations or separate states,
unable to focus on transformations between separate states.
Predominant in his cognitive functioning is what Piaget
calls the figurative aspect of thought, focused on the
perceptual elements of objects. Yet, with all of these
developmental limitations acknowledged, it is important
to note that at the end of this stage the child is typically
moving toward the more systematic, logical thought as
revealed, for example, in the ability to conceive and to
handle class inclusion or seriation problems.
The third stage, concrete operations, is a period in
which the child develops the ability to think deductively
a form of abstract thinking—although such deductions are
limited in scope and range, based on witnessed events.
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The thinking characteristic of this period is, then,
deductive, but the content of thought is real objects
rather than other deductions (Forman, 1980b). It is the
beginning of organizing thoughts into coherent structures
and arranging them in various relations.
The fourth cognitive stage is called the formal
operational period and is characterized by logical opera-
tions no longer directly or necessarily bound to objects.
Operations become the content of thinking. The child can
think about thought, reflect on ideas as well as think
about concrete objects. He is able to formulate and compre-
hend general laws or principles which underlie particular
instances, deal with purely hypothetical concepts, entertain
logically notions which my be physically impossible. Piaget
describes this sophisticated level as hypothetico-deductive
thinking.
These limits of cognitive development represent
successive stages, each of which builds on its predecessor.
The achievements of earlier stages are not discarded in
favor of newer, more sophisticated versions; rather, those
achievements are incorporated, restructured and reorganized
to form more advanced complex forms of functioning. Piaget
views the child's cognitive development as a continuous,
connected and consistent progression, spiralling toward
formal operational thought, with patterns from each stage
/
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being successively reorganized and incorporated into the
next
.
These stages of cognitive development clearly
represent an important contribution to the field. But,
as indicated at the beginning of the chapter, it is a
mistake to focus on them as a point of departure in
dealing with Piagetian concepts. This misplaced emphasis
has in fact been problematic in many American applications
of Piaget and has often led to misguided attempts to
accelerate development. The epistemology, the principles
and factors in cognitive development, not only the stages,
are central to his thought. They are also the most
productive reference points for discussing pedagogical
implications and applications, which is the next task of
this study.
CHAPTER VI
PEDAGOGY OF CONSTRUCTIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
LEARNING NEEDS OF THE EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED
Building upon the conceptual framework of the
constructivist approach, what are its pedagogical impli-
cations for dealing with learning needs of emotionally
disturbed children? This chapter begins with a general
resume of the relevance of the constructivist perspective
to the particular characteristics and learning needs of
the emotionally disturbed. It then examines more speci-
fically how this approach would deal differently with the
four critical areas previously identified and used as
reference points in the critique of behaviorist pedagogy
(Chapter IV) . The chapter and study concludes with an
indication of some areas that need further study and
development if the constructivist alternative is to be
employed more extensively and effectively in the education
of emotionally disturbed children.
Relevance of Constructivism for the Education
of the Emotionally Disturbed
As indicated earlier in this study, a behaviorist
approach to the education of emotionally disturbed children
may be considered appropriate for dealing with certain
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short-term educational needs and superficial manifestations
of this disorder. Indeed, it is the limited, immediate
and concrete quality of the approach that has contributed
to its appeal and widespread use in educational programs
for this group. But in many important respects the
behavior modification approach, in dealing with external
symptomatic behavior, converges with, rather than corrects,
predispositions of the emotionally disturbed. It does not
touch the variety, and complex interaction, of variables
that lie at the root of the disturbance. Consequently, it
does not represent a viable approach for serving interme-
diate and longer term needs that must be met if more
thorough and sustained growth is to be achieved.
The contribution of the constructivist alternative
is that it provides a lens for recognizing the nature and
interactive relationship of significant variables—the
affective, cognitive, social and psycho-motor. It thus
represents a more sound basis for diagnosis , a more
complete frame of reference for prescriptive action.
The relevance of the constructivist perspective for
the education of the emotionally disturbed may be summarized
by relating components of its conceptual framework, dis-
cussed in Chapter V, to selected characteristics of
emotionally disturbed children described in Chapter IV.
of educational priorities forA constructivist view
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disturbed children focuses on developing intrinsic
motivational patterns and excluding as much as possible
external reinforcement strategies in more complex learning
situations. There is emphasis on the child's taking more
responsibility for his own processes of inquiry and
consequently increasing his intrinsic motivation and his
striving for independence and competence. In de-emphasizing
external motivation, the constructivists minimize the
problems of maintaining interest, of transferring learning,
and of transition from dependence on reinforcer or external
authority.
Dewey corroborates the point stressed in this
approach:
If the subject matter grows out of the child's
own past doings, thinkings, and sufferings, and
grows into applications in further achievements
and receptivities, then no device or trick of
method has to be resorted to in order to enlist
'interest' (Dewey, 1902, p. 27).
Piagetians would draw out the child's interests in similar
ways and begin the curriculum spiral that employs an idea
or problem at sequentially different levels, each time
seeking higher order thought process
.
This approach focuses on broader intellectual issues
and avoids presenting these in small increments. Instead
the child is given whole patterns to deal with or is
encouraged to break tasks down for himself as part of an
active construction. It avoids a narrow, figurative
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emphasis which would focus on simple properties in favor
of fostering inference, prediction, analysis, and in
general a pattern of reflective thinking. In so doing,
this position assists the children in developing frustration
tolerance which is crucial in their battle with impulsive
responses. More complex cognitive experiences are likely
to lead eventually to delayed responses, a habit of thought
that can then influence the ways in which these children
approach other social and cognitive problems
.
The static modes of thinking and learning character-
istic of emotionally disturbed children are treated by the
constructivists as idiosyncratic but not categorically
different from earlier levels of development. According
to this approach, these children are capable of progressing
to more operative forms of thought and the active curriculum
is designed in part to alter their static focus. Emphasis
is always on the transformational character of object
relations and events. This affords the opportunity for the
children to escape the circular pattern which moves from
static focus to passive involvement to lack of inquiry
skills or methods to solidifying the overall functional
pattern. Constructivists hope to break the circle,
inter-
jecting active methods and consequently more internalized
motivation and greater self-confidence for the children
in
their own abilities to transform and to comprehend.
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The overaccommodative reality-distorting aspects to
the pathology of this group, their difficulties with
object-permanence, symbol-referent confusion and perspec-
tive-taking are addressed by the constructivists partly
through the use of active methods of inquiry and partly
through emphasis on developing autonomy. The self-regula-
tory, autonomous character of the knower in acquiring
knowledge is a sought-after quality in the development of
these children.
The educational strategies to accomplish changes in
their overaccommodation include encouraging them to make
changes in their environment, to manipulate objects, to
alter them so that the children experience- a sense of
appropriate power and will feel less compelled to distort
reality as a protective device. These same strategies
foster a stronger sense of self as distinct from others
and the outside world, allowing appropriate boundaries
and consequently moving toward a more autonomous stance.
Other prominent features of disturbed children's
educational patterns are avoidance of conflict, functional
confusion between symbols and referents, a general ego-
centric perspective and a characteristic impulsivity.
Constructivists view these as intricately interwoven
aspects of cognitive, emotional and social functioning and
recommend a curriculum which confronts these problems in
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terms of providing active involvement in social and
cognitive decentering or perspective-taking tasks,
practice in determining some of their own social
boundaries and limitations, and participating intensely
in a social context designed to elicit stronger self-
concepts .
An important element brought to bear in this
approach is the teacher's emphasis on knowledge about the
child, about the ways he typically constructs knowledge
at given levels, about the idiosyncratic ways in which
the disturbed child carries out similar tasks.
Dewey's (1902) concern over the fractionalizing of
curriculum into discrete and separate disciplines, bounded
by class-time and textbook, is shared by Piagetian
constructivists. The universe is fluid and fluent,
according to Dewey and a traditional curriculum fails to
reflect this fluidity. Piagetian educators attempt to
meet the disturbed child's fractionalized, fragmented view
of the world with a curriculum based on principles of
continuity and connection.
These recommendations from constructivists are
representative of their general approach and indicative of
the way education for disturbed children is organized
within such a system. The following section, devoted to
discussion of the four critical areas, deals in more detail
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with the educational implications of the constructivist
position.
Implications in Four Critical Areas
Earlier in this study the behaviorist approach was
criticized partially in reference to its adequacy as a
pedagogical guide for handling four areas: emotional/
cognitive conflict; intellectual, social and emotional
autonomy; the role of error; and the role of active
inquiry. The relative merits of the constructivist
approach have been implicitly or explicitly indicated in
this critique, as well as in subsequent discussion of
constructivist concepts.' Here the intent is to summarize
the distinctive constructivist orientation, and discuss its
pedagogical implications, in each area.
Emotional /Cognitive Conflict
. . .
Changes take place by virtue of
conflict. . . . Development . . . consists in
the production of contradictions as much as
in their resolution (Hass, 1977).
Disturbed children, as described earlier in this
study, typically experience intense and chronic emotional
conflict. The inadequate treatment of behaviorist programs
with regard to this issue was also delineated. The con-
structivist approach to this pernicious and pervasive aspect
of the children's functioning takes a totally different
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direction. Instead of extinguishing the behavior indicating
such conflict, constructivists attempt to provide real and
manageable contexts in which to encounter a cognitive
version of conflict. This is educationally planned,
elicited conflict; it is induced by the environmental
situations designed by educators for this purpose.
While conflict and tension in the raw emotional
versions bring about anxiety and discomfort for these
children, cognitive conflict plays a central role in
intellectual growth. It addresses indirectly the
intensity of their chronic emotional conflict; its use in
an educational program provides the children with necessary
experience and consequent strategies that lead to better
resolutions in the cognitive area—a process which might
parallel the management of emotional conflict as well.
Academic tasks carry with them a modicum of emotional
distance which can be used to introduce these children to
conflict in a non-threatening way. It is easier for them
to handle an intellectual dilemma than a social or intense
emotional one, particularly if it is carefully introduced
and actually elicited by a curriculum plan. This arena
provides an opportunity for children to practice their
intellectual coping strategies. Such experience can be
slowly increased within the curriculum and could eventually
f transferring coping mechanisms toserve as a means o
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experience in daily living as well. There is then an
on-going spiral of confidence in intellectual areas
contributing to social/emotional competence, which in
turn enables them to attempt more intellectual encounters
with cognitive dilemmas.
Not only in terms of their specific needs as disturbed
children, but also in more general terms of intellectual
development, it seems necessary to experience a certain
amount of cognitive conflict.
What is presented to the child should match
his present cognitive structures and should
challenge him in the sense of providing
optimal conflict so that through accommoda-
tion and assimilation, cognitive restructuring
can take place with consequent development of
the cognitive structures (McNally, 1973, p.
94).
This conflict-inducing strategy can be descriptively
sketched as follows. The teacher places himself near the
children as they actively work out the solution to a
given or self-imposed problem. If the children have
worked out an intermediate solution, taking only some data
into consideration, the teacher will then introduce a
contrasting object or an idea or material that conflicts
with the current solution, giving the children the
opportunity to incorporate the conflicting data, but at
the same time offers no correction of their formulation.
This introduces a paradox in which what was expected did
not occur but rather there was a transformation or
variation of the expectation (Forman and Hill, 1981, p.
33) .
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Such a conflict-inducing procedure presupposes, of
course, appropriate prior curriculum decisions. Classroom
tasks ideally are derived from the children's own experience,
as authentic problems arising from experiences with inter-
esting data found within the classroom. A teacher has the
option of introducing problems although this is most
effectively accomplished as a result of prior observation
of the child's interests, strategies, levels of cognitive
and social functioning and previous patterns demonstrated
on other tasks
.
The teacher must be able to ask puzzling questions
which evoke conflict or contradiction, which in turn
evoke the need for another perspective or the need to
reexamine an overlooked aspect. He must be able to
structure those questions on the spot while observing the
child's particular perplexities and insights.
A specific suggestion to evoke conflict and to help
teachers convey the continuum- like place occupied by
opposites and thereby have children more easily recognize
their transformational nature is made by Forman and
Hill.
Options should be provided not just in pairs, each with
its diametrec opposite, but linked with at
least one other
middle choice. "The middle choice is often
used to
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generate the conflict necessary to reconcile the opposites,
like the boy who realized he could not call the middle sized
doll either tall or short, so he called it a little tall"
(Forman and Hill, 1981, p. 40). This kind of strategy would
make the conflict definitely experienced but probably
manageable for a disturbed child.
Constructivists, in stressing conflict- inducement as
a positive curriculum strategy, address the issue described
earlier of the disturbed child's own experience of emo-
tional conflict. Providing an educational dimension of
managing conflict is likely to produce better strategies
with which they can come to terms with their emotional
conflict
.
This approach affords opportunities for the child
to resolve conflict and for him to reflect on that resolu-
tion process—both activities are important in transferring
what is learned to the area of emotional conflict. It is
an extrapolation from a specific cognitive event to a more
generalizable affective awareness. The interaction of
cognitive and affective elements has been delineated in
several contexts earlier in this study. Its importance is
noted once again with reference to conflict. Gains
achieved in one context are felt in the other and promote
some change there too. The process takes on a spiralling
motion affecting the child's overall patterns of relating
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to cognitive or emotional conflicts.
The constructivist's way of addressing this two-
sided issue has the distinct advantage of dealing actively
with the emotional conflict. This is in contrast to the
behaviorist approach, presented earlier, which treats the
symptoms of the conflict with the simplistic hope of
eliminating their mainfestations through appropriate
reinforcement. Constructivists are attempting to aid the
child in restructuring his relationship to conflict, to
put him more in control of its pervasive effects and not
merely to gloss over its superficial aspects.
This procedure has another advantage over a behavior-
ist method. Instead of focusing on past reinforcements,
the child is encouraged to predict consequences in a
future oriented way. It leads attention away from factual
memory and toward the anticipation of results a more
productive strategy for disturbed children who, as we have
seen, tend to fix on static aspects and focus on current
states without looking forward or thinking predictively
.
Such prediction with respect to conflict—inducing situations
is important in any context of the curriculum.
A third advantage of promoting cognitive conflict has
to do with the child's actively owning the answer he finally
provides, as opposed to the passive acceptance of the
"right" answer, suggested by the authority of the teacher
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or text
,
appropriately reinforced in a behaviorist system.
The concept of learning for the constructivist
includes knowing that one event is a variation on a
previously known theme as well as how that is the case.
It is a process of knowing why irrelevant stimuli are in
fact irrelevant and how those selected fit into a previous
cognitive framework. This kind of data is best drawn
from active participation in a curriculum designed to
elicit independent responses to planned cognitive conflict.
Piagetians applying the theory in classroom settings
deliberately plan for induced conflict as a response to
materials, experiences, questions or problems posed for
the children (Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, 1974; Case,
1976) . These approaches are organized in ways designed to
elicit cognitive conflict as part of a continuing, planned
process of inquiry. They are not linear programs with
specific responses expected. Rather, they have open
possibilities of resolution, but the conflict is a built- in
feature. This is important for disturbed children even
though its use may require additional emotional support
in the initial use. This would be necessary until these
children were accustomed to this new model of inquiry.
Duckworth (1979) suggests that this feature of
conflict should be evident in a rich problem-eliciting/
problem solving environment which, in her view, is more
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important than attempts at matching specific curriculum
tasks to specific levels of each child.
Autonomy
It is by exercising his ability to govern his
own beliefs and actions that the child gradu-
ally constructs internally coherent knowledge,
morality, and personality (DeVries, 1978, p.
88 ) .
The development of autonomy is comprised of two
separate but highly integrated aspects: social and cogni-
tive. Each has a significant impact on growth, with
reciprocal influence of each exerted upon the other.
The development of social autonomy is a complex
process rendered more so because of the complications of
social relationships as experienced by disturbed children.
It begins with an egocentric view of the world and ideally
progresses beyond this stage. It is one aspect of social
development within a general context of social interaction.
Social interaction, and indeed the entire realm of
social functioning is, for Piaget, a fertile ground for
restructuring the early egocentric patterns of children.
Disturbed children, particularly, experience grave problems
with this development and the deficiency in this context
further contributes to regressed functioning in other
social and cognitive areas.
The primary mode in which this problem is demonstrated
relates to seeing the perspective of another individual,
or
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rather disturbed children's failure to do so. It is
relevant in both its social dimension, i.e., seeing an
event or problem as another person sees it, and in its
more cognitive dimension, i.e., visually representing an
object or event as rotated in space as if viewed from
another standpoint. These are interconnected abilities
and difficulty with these for disturbed children seems
often to be followed by difficulty progressing into more
complex facets of thinking.
For this reason, it is important to focus on the
possible ways in which to address this issue in educating
disturbed children. In order to do this it is important
to begin with the initial view of the self that is to be
distinguished from others in this developmental ability
and to consider how constructivists address this in
contrast to behaviorists
.
A constructivist view emphasizes the relationship
between the individual and his environment or social frame
of reference, and defines this relationship as completely
reciprocal, dialectical and interactive. A human being
as an active subject determines the world and the environ-
ment; at the same time he is being determined by that
world. According to this perspective, self and society
qj-0 inextricably woven together , maintaining , changing
,
another in an interconnected fashion.restructuring one
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The self, then, is not passively determined by the social
order, but rather is actively responding to the social
order in which it functions; it derives its form from that
dynamic interaction.
In contrast, according to Skinner, self-concepts
which are based on a feeling of autonomy are culturally
fostered illusions. The appropriate meaning assigned is
expressed by Skinner in the following statement:
A self is a repertoire of behavior appropriate
to a given set of contingencies, and a substan-
tial part of the conditions to which a person
is exposed may play a dominant role. The
identity conferred upon a self arises from the
contingencies responsible for the behavior
(Skinner
,
1971)
.
According to this view, the only type of self-aware-
ness that is not illusory involves the individual 1 s ability
to discriminate the operant properties of his own behavior
which serve as sources of control for himself and social
others
.
Given these contrasting views of the self in relation
to its environment, it is predictable that the constructiv-
ist view would address the developing of perspective-taking,
with differentiation of self from other and with the
educational implications of these issues as a major thrust
in changing the functional patterns of disturbed children.
The behaviorist tends instead to treat particular behaviors
in particular instances without reference to such underlying
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development.
Perspective-taking can be seen as a tool, a device
of thought that helps to decenter a child's view and to
orient him toward a more logical frame of reference,
aiming for the kind of thought shared in a community of
inquirers. "We must strive to lead the child to construct
for himself the tools that will transform him from the
inside—that is, in a real sense and not only on the
surface" (Piaget, 1973).
Egocentricity is characteristic of early child
development. Differentiation between self and other, self
and objects, self and events occurs only gradually. It is
a slow and difficult process for all children and depends
a great deal upon the quality and intensity of the child's
experiences and the patterns of interaction between himself
and significant others in his world. It is a far more
difficult and complicated process in disturbed children
whose self-other differentiation is typically inadequate
(Cowan, 1978; Schmid-Kitisikis , 1976? Reid, 1978a, 1978b).
These children characteristically exhibit a
functional repertoire of limited decentering abilities
and a fusion with persons, events and objects surrounding
them. Because the fusion and confusion often render the
distinction between self and other quite blurred, such
children experience great difficulty in moving away from
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egocentric patterns of viewing the world. In a develop-
mental context, the ability to decenter, to take the role
or perspective of another, is seen as a special case of a
more fundamental capacity to departicularize the focus of
conceptual activities and learn to consider and coordinate
simultaneously two or more points of view (Langer, 1969).
Because of their affective and/or cognitive develop-
mental delays, disturbed children tend to remain at this
level of egocentrism, in a state of recurrent subject-
object confusion which operates to confine an individual
to a singular and highly personalized point of view while
denying to others the uniqueness of their own vantage
(Chandler, 1977). They fail to progress from that phase
which Piaget describes as heteronomy—being governed from
without; the attainment of autonomy— internal governing of
oneself does not develop properly if at all. What they
fail to accomplish is: (a) a mode of functioning charac-
terized by independence and self-reliance as well as (b)
an increasing comprehension of other points of view, of
notions of fairness, justice and equality. Anthony (1956,
1970) corroborates this in his research:
Under pathological conditions such [autonomous]
development might fail to occur with the result
that the child remains an undifferentiated,
heteronomous individual, highly dependent on
external authority for his attitudes and
behavior (Anthony, 1970, p. 731).
For educational and diagnostic purposes, assessment
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procedures have been developed to measure a child's
ability to decenter. These strategies require subjects
to describe objects or events from multiple points of
view while maintaining a single position. The tests have
focused on both visual perspective and social and inter-
personal contexts. Severely disturbed children have
demonstrated highly significant deficits in identifying
objects depicted from other viewpoints, in adopting
different social roles and in acknowledging another
individual's personal viewpoint (Neale, 1966; Chandler,
1973; Chandler et al., 1974). Anthony (1956) found that
disturbed children demonstrated significant egocentricism
in both interpersonal and impersonal contexts.
The implications tend to be maintained throughout
different types of situations (Feffer, 1959; Feffer and
Gourevitch, 1960, Feffer and Suchotliff, 1966). Disturbed
children tend to have difficulty decentering or developing
role—taking abilities in all contexts. This nonegocentric
form of thought, as Piaget (1970) views it, is not simply
synonymous with accurate social judgment but refers instead
to the ability to anticipate another's possible view,
precisely when they differ from one's own.
It is this ability to anticipate other views that
has far reaching implications for social and cognitive
development. Socially, it is the beginning of empathy.
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which is crucial in satisfactory interpersonal relation-
ships. Cognitively, it is the beginning of a more
objective, non-egobound view of the world, of inquiry
unfettered by one's own subjective preferences and views.
Feffer (1970) argues that because decentering is a crucial
element in the developmental structuring of experience, the
inability of a disturbed child to accomplish this task
contributes significantly to his pathology and his retarded
development in both social and cognitive areas of function-
ing .
"Various impersonal cognitive problems, such as
conservation of liquids and more interpersonal problems,
such as the coordination of multiple points of view, are
regarded as formally similar" to the perspective-taking
skills (Chandler, 1977, p. 117). The basic skill involved
is simultaneously considering and coordinating multiple
dimensions—a task which can be viewed as an essential
ingredient in most later formal operational thought. Rubin
(1973) has found that impersonal cognition (person to
object) and interpersonal cognition (person to person) are
based on the same underlying decentration process.
The connection between social and cognitive aspects
of development, then, are especially highlighted with
respect to autonomy. Piaget views the cognitive development
correlative aspect of the socialof reciprocity as a
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development of personal independence (Piaget, 1973).
Chandler (1973, 1974) has shown that planned
experience with role-taking does effect changes in the
levels of social adaptation on the part of individuals
demonstrating delayed egocentric patterns of thought.
This research suggests that a constructivist approach to
decentering tasks in the classroom would foster movement
away from egocentric patterns typically exhibited by
disturbed children. The research addressing the connection
between the social and cognitive aspects of this develop-
mental question for autonomy further suggests that progress
on either side affects the progress of the other (Chandler,
1973, 1974; Rubin, 1973). Thus developing educational
plans that will aid a disturbed child in improving his
decentering skills in a social area will have significant
implications for this cognitive growth. Piaget views this
process as not only remedial but as interactively spiralling
toward improvement of the child's overall social and
cognitive adaptation (Piaget, 1973)
.
In Piaget's view, social interaction is often
responsible for stimulating questions, contradictions and
the consequent reorganizing considered necessary for
learning. It is, of course, a prior condition that the
child have a sufficient amount of competence to recognize
the contradictions presented in the group interaction
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process. It is still the child’s own activity that
eventually determines a pattern of reorganization, but
the stimulation experienced in productive peer group
dynamics is often an important aid in development.
Piaget sees this dynamic as less likely to set up
the typical dependencies found in teacher-centered
situations and to allow contradiction to be experienced
without pressure to accept the teacher's "right" answer or
without trying to please the teacher. The group membership
in early developmental stages provides an enormous influence
in changing intuitional patterns eventually into opera-
tional structures, and dependent behavior into more
independent functioning.
If developing social autonomy depends largely on
providing classroom experience with role-playing or other
activities that will encourage perspective-taking, then
cognitive autonomy, being closely aligned, requires
similar strategies. Its development requires both the
social versions of perspective-taking which interact with
the cognitive side, as well as intellectual tasks that
require viewing problems, strategies, visual or auditory
materials from another's point of view.
In order to further enhance the development of
autonomy, the teacher must refrain from applying external
reinforcement— at least in certain tasks. Giving children
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praise—even though preferable to negative criticism
—
reinforces their dependence on a controlling environment.
Giving them, instead, responses that encourage further
interactions that stimulate creativity and reasoning
strengthens internal regulation and independent thinking.
A teacher, according to this constructivist position,
should avoid giving praise as well as criticism, either of
which labels children's responses good or bad, right or
wrong. Instead they should be allowed to enjoy their
problem-solving efforts. Teachers might better be alert
for new problems to pose in order to improve upon their
methods whenever necessary (Forman and Hill, 1981).
Thus intrinsic reinforcement affects children's
autonomy as well as it affects the quality and effective
transfer of their learning. Developing their own patterns
of independent thought is crucial for disturbed children
whose dependence otherwise impedes their willingness to
risk and to inquire actively.
If children, irrespective of developmental
level, can be assisted in the world view,
that static states are momentary positions
in time, this helps them organize discrete
events into a useful, functional scheme,
and that in turn gives the locus of control
back to the child . . . and assists the
child's construction of an autonomous self
(Forman and Hill, 1981, p. 40).
This does not mean that in a constructivist system
children will have complete freedom or that the teacher
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takes an extreme permissive stance. On the contrary, the
teacher functions as an authority figure, much needed by
disturbed children for a feeling of security, but the
authority of the teacher is not total, nor is it exerted
unnecessarily. Educational planning is carried out with
an eye toward cooperation between child and adult as well
as among children, and with the focus upon the teacher
setting the stage for the child's activity.
To the extent that a child is motivated extrinsically
and generally reinforced or controlled externally, he is
prevented from developing an autonomous pattern of func-
tioning, of governing himself on the basis of convictions,
values and knowledge constructed by himself.
Special children are regarded as needing special
structure—a proposition which has most often resulted in
a behaviorist approach designed to apply measures needed
to attain such structure. Rigid schedules and sequences
are totally inappropriate for these children and they are
likely to be less able than normal children to follow
such rigid programming or teaching styles which may not
approximate their own learning style.
To attempt to supplant their lack of inner
structure with one that is externally imposed,
is to avoid the issue altogether. Where
internal structuration is lacking, children
who are not helped to achieve better organi-
zational strategies are at the mercy of their
parents and teachers on whom they must rely
to organize their thinking and activities for
them (Reid, 1978b)
.
Classroom settings characterized by cooperative
learning environments, as recommended by constructivists.
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have been shown to facilitate cognitive and social
development, and to maintain gains over time (Doise,
Mugny and Perret-Clermont
,
1975; Knight-Arest and Reid,
1979). Furthermore, these children were able to use
logical and unique arguments in explaining what they
learned. The explanations reflected genuine cognitive and
social changes, not merely imitation.
Using instructional strategies of cooperative effort
in the classroom for building social and cognitive autonomy
then, is an extension of Piagetian principles. The success
of such strategies has been documented in several areas.
Cooperative learning was found effective: (a) in academic
content areas and in the acquisition of basic skills; (b)
in greater mastery of higher level questions and advanced
problem solving strategies, accompanied by success in
specific information gains; and (c) in social and affective
gains, more altruistic behavior, and the transfer of these
gains across academic/social boundaries (Sharan, 1980;
Slavin
,
1980; Lazarowitz , Sharan and Steinberg, 1980).
Role of Error
Mistakes are at the very base of human thought
,
embedded there, feeding the structure like root
nodules. If we were not provided with the
knack of being wrong, we could never get
anything useful done (Thomas, 1974, p. i/).
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Error, for the constructivist, is not something to
be eliminated from the child's educational horizon. Rather,
it serves a myriad of productive uses, as sketched earlier
in this study with respect to the behaviorist inadequacies
in this context. It is useful as a diagnostic tool for
teachers to draw upon, as an opportunity to increase the
affective strength of disturbed children via developing a
safe forum in which to risk and to err. In the realm of
cognitive development, error is significant in yielding
insight for the child into his own interpretations, in
suggesting interesting new approaches to other questions
if incorrect in this instance. Its occurrence solidifies
the right response in a more internalized way and as a
result fosters retention of material (Blank, 1973; Forman
and Kuschner, 1977). In terms of broader goals like coming
to trust one's own thought processes, and finally in
developing a self-correcting, self-regulating approach to
learning, error is a significant factor.
Learning takes place through attempts to compensate
for the disturbances occuring when inadequate assimilative
schemes are applied. Errors, in this sense, are the very
source of growth (Reid, 1978b). Piaget views contradiction
and error as motivating forces, without which knowledge
would remain static. According to this view, if
error and
contradiction lead to the compensations which in turn
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foster re-equilibration of structures
,
it follows that
incremental learning steps designed to eliminate error will
lead, at best, to the acquisition of information but not
to higher levels of development.
We human beings are, according to some scientists,
programmed for error and should use it as a stepping stone
in inquiry.
Other creatures do not seem to have DNA
sequences for making mistakes as a routine
part of daily living, certainly not for
programmed error as a guide for action.
. . .
The lower animals do not have this
splendid freedom. They are limited, most
of them, to absolute infallibility (Thomas,
1974, p. 39)
.
Errors are seen as essential extensions from the
child's current concept to a more advanced, more equili-
brated level, as ways of reworking his knowledge base.
De-emphasizing dichotomies generally, and particularly with
respect to right and wrong, correct or incorrect, paves the
way for viewing responses or solutions along continua of
adequacy, appropriateness, efficacy, comprehensiveness and
so forth. This avoids in the educational setting itself
the devastating impact of a wrong response as characteris-
tically experienced by disturbed children. This
view
restructures the process of knowing itself to
accommodate
this notion of continua instead of dichotomies
or polarized
opposites
.
Then each error is seen as a progression
toward a
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more fully equilibrated response, a dynamic flow of
developmental change which elicits less anxiety in children
already over- anxious about potential failure. Such a
procedure renders their errors self-informative, a process
of feedback in a larger pattern of inquiry. This process
builds a child's competence in handling ideas and sense of
confidence in his ability to function more independently
of the teacher's correction or praise (Blank, 1973; Forman
and Kuschner, 1977)
.
Once again the intrinsic/extrinsic alignment in the
constructivism/behaviorism comparison is relevant. With
respect to error, here it is the disturbed child's own
self-regulatory process that restructures an unworkable
or erroneous solution; it is not an external authority
figure reinforcing a right response. This intrinsic/
extrinsic contrast between the two systems has been examined
with respect to many issues in this study. The treatment
of error by the constructivists supplies still another
contrast by virtue of the intrinsic handling of error by
the child himself. He is the locus of control, although
the teacher retains an important role of posing appropriate
questions and/or materials to foster the initiation of the
child's self-regulation.
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Active Inquiry
Subject-matter never can be got into the child
from without. Learning is active. It involves
reaching out of the mind. It involves organic
assimilation from within (Dewey, 1902, p. 9).
Active inquiry includes activity brought to bear on
objects, active thought about the relationships and continu-
ities between objects and events, as well as active focusing
on the transformational elements and properties as opposed
to static descriptors of objects and events. According to
Piaget, children must not be encouraged merely to respond
to the environment but rather to act upon it. Cowan (1978)
uses the metaphor "interactive generator-transformer" to
describe the child as learner, a term which he bases on
Piagetian epistemology. It suggests the dynamic relation-
ship of the child to his environment and the active mode
which inquiry must take.
Thus activity functions in a constant way in a
constructivist curriculum although at some developmental
stages it is more overt and obvious, more directly related
to objects, while at other later stages it is less directly
related to objects and events in the environment. In
attempting to teach some principle at early stages, the
initial presentation should be couched in concrete terms,
with direct manipulation involved. The activity is focused
upon objects. Then the activity can become more internal-
ized and schematic by reducing perceptual and motor
supports
,
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from objects to symbols or from motor action to speech.
Significant supporting data regarding the importance
of active exploration for functional and conceptual growth
have come from the field of psycho-biology. Because these
experiments dramatize so powerfully and, in another mode
of verification, demonstrate the importance of this kind
of activity for learning, several are described here.
Experiments were performed in which visual perception
was distorted by artificial lenses--those that inverted the
picture of surrounding space, or those that divided left
and right into blue and yellow, are but two of many
examples. Subjects were divided into groups either passive
or active in their approach to their new perceptual
experience . In all cases, the active, exploring group
adjusted and corrected the distortion while the passive
group experienced difficulty and often never accommodated
at all (Kohler, in Restak, p. 1979, p. 116).
Kohler concluded that the accuracy of our perceptions
about the world and our extraction of knowledge from the
data both depend on our ability to actively explore our
environment
.
Drs . R. Held and A. Hein reared a litter of
kittens in complete darkness until the time
of their ingenious experiment. One kitten
was then freed to explore the environment
while dragging a basket containing a second
kitten. (A pully arrangement enabled the
second kitten's basket to move through the
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same territory covered by the active kitten.)
These researchers discovered that the first
kitten, the active explorer, developed percep-
tion, while the passive animal remained blind
(Restak, 1979, p. 117) .
Thus Restak, in analyzing this research views the
process of developing a picture of reality as an "act of
construction." Even if the probabilities are skewed— as
in the experimental distortions or the kittens' initial
deprivation, and ensuing impressions are "wrong," correction
can be made if there is an opportunity to interact with
the stimulus. He sees the results of this research as
emphasizing the role of activity in perceptual learning
and in cognitive development in general.
The role of active exploration in cognitive develop-
ment is again demonstrated in an experiment of Dr. Mark
Rosenzweig in which he sought to find the impact of
environmental stimulation of actual physiological brain
growth. In the experiment, three contrasting environments
were contrived: in the first group single rats remained
in the standard laboratory group cage with two others; the
second group consisted of single rats in solitary confine-
ment, having no opportunity for social interaction; the
third or enriched environment provided many toys and a
larger space in which these rats could move about. Then
the brains of each rat were examined.
In all cases, the rats from the enriched
environment showed an increase in the number
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of nerve cells and a greater weight of cerebral
cortex, along with a thicker cortical covering.
In addition, important brain enzymes showed
significant elevations, which are thought to
correlate with a greater number of connections
between nerve cells and heightened cerebral
arousal (Restak, 1979, pp. 124-125).
In Restak 's view, "the brain does not so much develop
as respond to tens of thousands of environmental variables."
One variable that the behaviorists often overlook is
novelty- seeking. Psychologist David Hebb constructed an
experiment in which both a familiar, direct route and an
unfamiliar, circuitous route were offered to rats and
contrary to a behaviorist expectation, the novel, new path
was chosen as often as the familiar (Restak, 1979).
Perhaps, then, novelty itself is rewarding, as well as the
explorations involved in the process.
This finding lends support to the data collected by
educators and epistemologists suggesting that active inquiry
promotes cognitive development in a way that passive absorp-
tion of information never could. It tends to corroborate
the constructivist view that in order to acquire knowledge,
the environment must be transformed, acted-upon, manipu-
lated, explored. "The immature brain is dependent on
sensory stimulation for normal growth, development
and
function. Sensory stimulation has, in fact, been
compared
to a 'nutrient'" (Restak, p. 143).
active inquiry approach comesFurther support for an
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from advocates in the field of information-processing who
do not believe that mental representations are stored as
permanently organized cognitive maps, but are rather
actively reconstructed from sets of stored cues whenever
a specific issue or problem arises. They view development
as the result of changes in the reconstruction rules
(Cellerier, 1976). There is active process in the con-
struction of knowledge as well as in the up-dating and
restructuring of the methods of exploration themselves.
These findings corroborate the importance of
providing opportunities for children to explore, actively
inquire
,
reflect on their findings and restructure,
presumably each time on a higher developmental level.
The spiralling upward toward more sophisticated levels of
thought is certainly delayed and erratic for disturbed
children, as noted earlier in this study, but emphasis
on the active, process-oriented aspects of educational
experiences would provide greater progress toward
intellectual competence and independence (Reid, 1978a,
1978b; Schmidt-Kitsikis , 1973; Cellerier, 1976; Safford,
1978)
.
The Role of the Teacher . Acceptance of a
Piagetian
framework concerning the primacy of activity in an
educa-
tional setting for disturbed children requires
a considera-
ble re-orientation from the predominating
behavionst view
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First, it suggests a significant change in the role of the
teacher. In a behaviorist setting, the teacher is typically
the active center of functioning, reinforcing responses of
the children to the transmission of knowledge. In a
constructivist setting, the teacher functions as a guide
to assist the child construct his own knowledge, to
strengthen the child's processes of reasoning, to promote
exploration, to present materials and devices that will
stimulate problem-solving and to provide counter-examples
that compel reflection and reconsideration of over-hasty
solutions .
The role of the teacher in this paradigm suggests an
approach strikingly different also from a maturationist
view. Piaget does not maintain that educators can sit
back and wait for maturation to accomplish the task of
developing reason. On the contrary, he recommends that
educators can devise experimental situations to facilitate
the child's invention of knowledge.
Because intelligence increases, according to Piaget
( 1970b) when the knower becomes sensitized to changes and
becomes attued to transformations instead of focussing only
on static properties, every effort should be made in
educational programs to plan for emphasizing change. The
teacher should provide experiences that bring children to
terms with these active elements.
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As discussed earlier in this study, emotionally
disturbed children tend to focus almost exclusively on
static elements of their experience. In order to overcome
this, teachers must foster an attitude of inquiry,
avoiding curricula based only on convergent thinking
models; secondly, they must plan for active involvement
with materials and open-ended, divergent inquiry; and
finally, they must emphasize the active transformations
occurring in and among objects and events, not merely the
passive observation of static states.
"Piaget demands that the teacher be an investigator
who is constantly observing, testing hypotheses, and
modifying materials and strategies to adapt to the child's
developmental propensities" (Elkind, 1979, p. 10) . The
teacher, then, is expected to function actively also, as
well as to foster active inquiry on the part of the child.
This model of active functioning is important for disturbed
children. It offers a transitional model of imitating the
active methods demonstrated by the teacher. It is a way
of utilizing their dependence on authority, gradually
to
take on the active patterns they observe, and eventually
to move away from passive dependence on authority
toward
a more active, independent functioning. The
locus of
organization must be increasingly vested in the
children,
not in the teacher's centralized and absolute
authority.
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It is the teacher's job to support open-ended inquiry,
for without such support these children, as described
earlier, tend toward static, non-risk approaches and would
not be likely to expand their systems of inquiry and would
remain at lower levels of cognitive functioning. The
teacher must undertake the on-going role of diagnostician
—
essentially in an informed way to determine how each
individual is processing the experiences provided and to
decide how best to provide the optimum challenge for that
child
.
The teacher's responsibility in a constructivist
setting, then, is not primarily to transmit knowledge in
terms of facts or concepts presented, but rather to
encourage the child's active participation on both physical
and mental levels. This participation occurs on different
^0Y0^s each successively depending on the other. First,
activity occurs at the motoric level in which the child
acts directly on objects, manipulating their physical
properties in space. The next level involves developing
intuitive internal versions of activity; this level is no
longer dependent on overt manipulation and no longer
limited by spatial and temporal restrictions. Finally,
there is the level of verbal understanding and
analytical
thought, which is essentially an abstraction of
activity.
It is important to recognize that the higher
levels
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directly depend upon the lower and that activity remains
a significant element even when thought becomes abstracted.
Importance of Social Interaction . For Piaget, social
interaction is an important element of the process of
active construction of knowledge. The emphasis is similar
to the action upon objects in that for development to
occur, there must be individual action upon a human group
with ensuing response by the group. The child's passive
presence in a social group will not necessarily foster
the successful coordination of his mental actions any more
than a passive relation to objects will foster a full
understanding of the object. The active participation of
a child within his social group implies his place as a
part within a whole, individually involved in the shifts
and changes of balance occurring within the group. "Such
a system of human relationships replicates the properties
of mental operations. It allows the child to become
himself, an action within a co-ordinated system of actions
(Richmond, 1970, p. 95).
Educationally, this suggests groups engaged in common
activity—an occurrence especially important for
disturbed
children who tend to react passively, focusing on
static
elements of a learning situation, and who tend
to be
dependent upon authority for answers. This
emphasis on
group activity and inquiry would lead to
the need for
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verification or justification of the child's own ideas, to
make adjustments to differing opinions and concessions to
contradictions and general discussion of these issues.
"As far as intelligence is concerned, co-operation is thus
an objectively conducted discussion (out of which arises
internalized discussion, i.e., deliberation and reflection)"
(Piaget, 1950, p. 162). Once again, overt action sets
the initial stage from which internalized, higher level
functioning will develop later.
Curriculum Issues . A constructivist-based educational
setting is essentially an open system premised on learning
through active participation with emphasis on developing
the autonomy which is so problematic for disturbed children.
It is important for these children that they construct some
of their own boundaries and constraints and not have them
constantly set by external authority. They typically
demonstrate inappropriate beliefs and fantasies, lack of
attention, and uncontrollable impulses, all of which tend
to curb exploration or to provoke teachers to authorita-
tively curb exploration and restrict their range and scope
of investigation.
With these characteristics in mind, a constructivist
educator would choose to plan curriculum experiences
that
help the child to risk exploration, to investigate
a per-
plexing problem. The experiences have the additional
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advantage for disturbed children of providing contact with
the world as others perceive it, of making predictions or
estimates about a real world that can be corroborated
outside their egocentric boundaries.
Papert (1980) recommends a curriculum along these
lines in which children construct their own "microworlds"
focusing on certain elements, assumptions and constraints
that allow exploration to be undisturbed by extraneous
questions of fact or accuracy. They can then transfer the
personal skills and habits acquired in their microworld
to the more formal domain of scientific inquiry. This
helps to avoid the dissociated relationship disturbed
children often experience in reaction to assigned content
not originating from their own involvement with materials
and ideas. Such dissociation is seen by Papert to be often
responsible for a child's failure to learn. They have been
forced out of meaningful relation to the material and have
adopted the most unproductive attitude of either noncompli-
ance or rote learning to please the teacher
.
The constructivist emphasis of process and activity
in the education of disturbed children shifts the focus
considerably from the behaviorist perspective emphasizing
content to be transmitted and behavior to be controlled.
The focus of such an active program is clearly on the
process of developing resources, active approaches to the
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environment which follows essentially William James'
definition of education: "In the last analysis, education
consists of the organizing of resources in the human being,
of powers of conduct which shall fit him to his social and
physical world" (James, 1899, p. 15).
Piaget's theory provides a conceptual basis for
viewing exceptional children in terms of capabilities, and
for understanding the compensations these children make
between their accommodations to objects and their assimila-
tory schemes. Its emphasis on active inquiry and developing
autonomy, as well as its methods of dealing with error and
conflict, form the basis of an approach offered as an
important, effective alternative to the behaviorist paradigm
currently influencing the education of disturbed children.
Concluding Remarks
Because behavior modification has held such
predominant sway in the education of emotionally disturbed
children, this study has devoted considerable attention to
a critique of behaviorist conceptual foundations and
applied practices in the education of this group. This
inquiry has produced ample evidence to suggest the urgent
need to give serious consideration to an alternative frame-
work for viewing the problem and elaborating more effective
pedagogical practices, a framework that goes beyond the
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limited, unidimensional orientation of behaviorism. It is
contended that constructivism provides an explanatory frame-
work that is significantly more sensitive and adequate for
understanding the dynamics of emotional disturbance and
growth, and yields an approach to pedagogy which is both
more sound and effective for the basic learning needs of
children with this disorder. Consequently the conceptual
foundations of constructivism and the pedagogical impli-
cations of this approach have been examined.
While significant applications of the constructivist
perspective have been made in the education of normal
children (Furth and Wachs , 1975; Forman and Kuschner, 1977;
Kamii-and DeVries, 1977; Forman and Hill, 1980), the
extension of these principles to the education of disturbed
children is only just beginning. When they have been used
with this group, the principles have often been applied
superficially. There has been either a tendency to focus
directly on the developmental tasks per se, or to over-
emphasize the developmental stages themselves. In either
case individual processes of learning are neglected. What
is needed is an increased interest in and application of
equilibration theory within these educational settings.
The approach should be pursued as a useful framework
and
vantage point from which to observe, understand and
modify
the particular strategies employed by these
children.
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What can be most productively drawn from Piaget's
work for application to the education of disturbed children
is his emphasis on independent inquiry—on learning how
• This presupposes teachers who are prepared in
their knowledge of child development and who understand
how to pose stimulating problems and provide provocative
materials and experiences; teachers whose observations and
interpretations of children's actions are sufficiently
astute to plan in an on-going fashion for appropriate
levels of cognitive conflict. The teacher in this model
must be able, through probing questions, to lead the child
to focus on certain productive aspects of an object or
event. Then the next task would be to take the child's
responses and plan further questions or strategies that
will elicit growth. Such educational experiences must be
arranged for disturbed children so that they can learn to
organize their own theories and activity according to
whatever idiosyncratic or tentative structures they possess.
If the constructivist alternative is to become a
viable and more practiced option in the education of
emotionally disturbed children there are a number of areas
where further development is needed.
In view of the tendency of practitioners to feel that
the nature of the emotionally disturbed indicates that
modifying behavior is the most that can reasonably be
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expected
,
one research need is to study more carefully the
actual educational options following from constructivist
theory.
Research on the connection between the experience
of chronic emotional conflict and the practice of induced
cognitive conflict might yield important findings which
could be productively applied in a constructivist educa-
tional setting.
There is a need to articulate the relationships
between impersonal and personal object permanence and the
consequent effect on emotional disturbance. Understanding
the ways in which to compensate for this in educational
terms would be invaluable for the growth of these children.
Since the constructivist approach depends greatly on
the qualities and capacities of teachers, training strate-
gies and methods need to be developed, as well as other
teacher support measures.
While constructivism may be a more demanding approach
that behaviorism within an educational setting, its appli-
cation as outlined in this study suggests promising results
in promoting long-term cognitive, social and emotional
growth for disturbed children.
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